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FOREWORD
Ten years have elapsed since the fall of the Berlin Wall,
which served as a fitting symbol for the end of the Cold War.
That historic juncture brought into question the main
edifice of western European security arrangements—the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization—that had served
Alliance members so well since NATO’s founding in 1949. It
also brought into question the rationale for America’s
continued deep involvement in European security affairs.
With the gradual realization that the Russian menace is
essentially dead, at least for the next 10 to 15 years and
perhaps longer, and with NATO’s missions having evolved
well beyond the original purpose of territorial defense,
debate on both sides of the Atlantic has begun to intensify
concerning the vital issue of where NATO should be headed
and America’s relation to the Alliance.
To bring an array of informed voices to the debate, four
institutions—the Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff
of the U.S. Army, the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S.
Army War College, the Irving B. Harris Graduate School of
Public Policy Studies of the University of Chicago, and the
Program on International Security Policy at the University
of Chicago—joined hands to sponsor a symposium titled
“The Future of U.S. Military Presence in Europe,” held at
the University of Chicago on August 4, 1999.
The present book is an outgrowth of this symposium. It
is not designed to set forth a literal record of words and
events in the mold of the traditional symposium
“proceedings,” but rather is organized as an anthology of
individual chapters complemented by selected questions,
answers, and comments by symposium participants and
attendees. The symposium opening address by Deputy
Secretary of Defense John Hamre (Chapter 1) and the
keynote address by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe
General Wesley Clark (Chapter 2) cogently set the stage for
discussion. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 address the first panel topic,
“Is Europe Still Strategically Important to the United
vii

States?” Chapters 6, 7, and 8 tackle the second topic,
“Potential New Missions for NATO in the 21 st Century,”
while Chapters 9, 10, and 11 are devoted to the last topic,
“What Type of Deployed Forces Does the United States
Require to Meet Its Commitments in Europe?
Noteworthy among the commentaries is the wrap-up on
pages 124-128 by General Crosbie E. Saint (USA Ret.). As
Commander in Chief of U.S. Army Europe during the period
of the Gulf War, General Saint supplied the U.S. Army VII
Corps, nominally slated as an element of NATO forces, to
the coalition command that executed Operation DESERT
STORM.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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CHAPTER 1
THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-EUROPEAN
RELATIONSHIP:
FRAMING THE DISCUSSION
John J. Hamre
In the history of the United States, there have been five
distinct epochs or periods of American security policy. The
first was from about 1776 until 1812, though it is a little
hard to find exact demarcation points. It obviously covered
the formation of the new republic, which did not instantly
form at the end of the Battle at Yorktown. It took quite a
while for the republic to jell. The early Congress almost
immediately threw away the Army and Navy. The Revenue
Cutter Service, the predecessor of the Coast Guard, became
the de facto Navy for some 10 years because the early
Congress said, in effect, “We don’t need a navy now, we don’t
need an army.” It cut the Army down to 50 people. It became
clear by 1812 that cutting the Army wasn’t a good idea. And
it became even clearer when the British in 1814 sailed up
the Potomac and set fire to Washington. The first epoch was
thus one in which we were getting our feet on the ground,
getting ourselves organized, thinking about defense, and
developing the philosophy we were going to need to
undergird the republic for the rest of its history.
The second epoch extends from 1814-1818 roughly to the
turn of the century. Obviously, there were some significant
events during that period, like the Civil War. But in terms of
our international security posture, it was a period when the
United States was relatively free to expand into the inner
territories of the North American continent. We were very
content simply with growing into the heartland of America.
We had relatively modest interests overseas, and we were
largely sheltered by the British navy. Thus we were
preoccupied with ourselves during that second epoch. It
ended, of course, with the Spanish American War.
1

The third period, which some think of as America’s
imperial phase, saw the United States turn outward, by
design annexing territory overseas and making it part of
America. The third period was culminated by our
expeditionary support for Allied forces during World War I,
when, in an atypically American act, we sent a large army
overseas, thus involving ourselves in what George
Washington called a “foreign war.” I’m not sure there is such
a thing as a foreign war for America any more. With the
globe today being so small, what were once perceived as
foreign wars now usually seem to be in our own backyard. In
any event, we made a conscious decision to get deeply
involved in the Great War, and the third epoch drew to a
close with the end of that war.
On entering the interwar years—the fourth security
epoch—America chose to retrench. In a way, this period
marked a kind of void in America’s military and security
history. But it was enormously important in a broader
sense, for it was the time when the two great forces of the
20th century emerged. On one hand, global recession set in,
leading to the rise of national socialism in Germany and
ultimately to World War II. On the other hard, international
communism, centered in the Soviet Union, would arise,
joining in an uneasy marriage of convenience with the West
to combat the Nazi scourge.
The fifth security epoch emerged from the ashes of World
War II—we commonly characterize it as the Cold War. It
was a time when the traditional international security
order was shattered. In its place a new order emerged,
initially very bipolar in character. That configuration
diffused significantly by 1960, but it still dominated our
security milieu during the second half of this century until
the historic date of November 9, 1989, when the Berlin Wall
came tumbling down.
I recall the first time I saw the Wall. It was ominous,
frightening. I never thought in my wildest imagination I
would live long enough to see it down. Then I remember
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going back another time. We went down late at night. As we
got closer, we began to hear this “chink, chink, chink.”
People were chipping away the wall, collecting pieces to sell
as souvenirs to tourists like me the next day. There were
other people busy with paint and brushes because the pieces
were worth more if they had paint on them. Typical
entrepreneurialism at work. Thus the fifth epoch ended in
1989. We are now 10 years into the next epoch, the sixth.
But what is this new period? It’s very hard to know. We
know roughly when it started, but we don’t know where it’s
going. Indeed, where it’s going is the subject of the present
book.
Though things are still pretty fuzzy, I believe it is
possible to discern some of the main features that will likely
distinguish this sixth epoch of American security history.
While the United States has emerged as the only global
superpower, it has not established a pax Americana in any
sense. Indeed, one trait of the sixth epoch is the disturbing
ethnic tribalism that now seems to characterize the
international security order. There are some 40 to 50 such
struggles going on around the world at this time, some of
them dreadful in the carnage and violence they produce.
A second trait is the frightening devolution of the
resources of violence from the old Soviet empire. For a
variety of reasons, those resources are becoming broadly
available in the new world. This huge arsenal of biological
and chemical weapons, and possibly even components of
nuclear weapons, may fall into the hands of very dangerous
people. Moreover, the large stable of Russian military
engineers and scientists left over from the Soviet era could
very well be lured into employment by elements inimicable
to our security. These are very troubling fall-outs from the
Soviet period.
A third trait is the emergence of
uncontrollable new transnational actors
Guerrilla organizations like that of Osama
example, appear able to shift and move
3

strange and
on the scene.
bin Laden, for
in and out of

government structures. It is very hard to know how you
deter these sorts of new actors since they are not always
dependent on the normal structures of government wherein
and around which deterrence has evolved during the last 50
years.
But several other transnational forces have emerged on
the scene that have implications for our security—the
globalization of entertainment and information typified by
the Internet, for example. The emergence of international
crime is increasingly difficult to distinguish from
international terrorism. In Colombia, we could soon find on
the international stage the first narco-state. Another of
these transnational forces is disease. Few realize how
profound the changes might be in Africa if the AIDS
epidemic there continues in its current pattern.
Also important to note is the transnational shift of jobs.
An American product today may have the computer chips
made in China, the software written in India, the handsets
made in Ireland, the satellite made in Italy, the launch
occurring in Russia, and we call it an American telephone
system. Ours is a profoundly different world where the jobs
have now gone international, and this trend extends even to
armaments. The global spread of armaments and the
technology of armaments, as we have seen, flows in large
measure from the disintegration of the old Soviet empire.
But not entirely because there are now some emergent
rogue actors such as North Korea, whose only source of
political pride and cash is the sale of items like Nodong
missiles.
What, then, are the broader implications of all these
features of the new security epoch? We can only see through
the glass darkly, but some of those implications are
beginning to appear at least in dim outline. For one,
stability is going to be an increasingly rare phenomenon in
this new epoch. The previous epoch, the Cold War epoch,
was at least characterized by great inertia. Though huge
forces were at work, they moved very slowly. That doesn’t
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appear to be the character of this new epoch. Second, it
seems that many of the international structures that were
created to mediate and manage security problems during
the Cold War epoch are increasingly brittle, if not
ineffective, in this new epoch. Recall how unnerved we all
were during the Asian economic crisis of 1998 when it
appeared that the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund could not cope because the disruptive forces
had grown bigger than the economic and financial
structures put in place by the industrial nations to
rationalize the international movement of capital. There
was widespread talk about having to re-engineer the entire
system. The problem seems to have abated, at least for the
time being, but I’m not at all sure the underlying factors
tending toward instability have been rectified. After all,
capital is more global today than at any time in history and
becoming more so.
The United Nations (UN) is increasingly irrelevant
because of the lack of consensus in the Security Council, a
structure that requires unanimity before effective action
can be taken. It is only the rare uncontroversial mission that
attracts sufficient support among UN members to pave the
way to action. When it comes to a big issue, like the Balkans,
the UN is frozen into immobility. Thus the structures of the
Cold War era are increasingly inapplicable in this new
period. There remains a question mark over NATO in this
regard. It is remarkable how NATO evolved to the point of
being able to contemplate uninvited military action in a
sovereign out-of-area state—it was the tragic situation in
Kosovo that made it happen. Yet I worry about what I see in
U.S. domestic political reactions to Kosovo and NATO
operations there.
When General Wesley Clark and I and others were at a
NATO conference in June 1999, I was struck by the
absolutely consistent view by other governments as to what
the Kosovo situation was all about. It was the first time in
history that NATO went to war for an idea. The
governments were saying that since they could not justify
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intervention on grounds of self-interest, they would appeal
to a transcendent ideal to justify it. In other words, it was
not sufficiently noble to go to war for national interests any
longer. Governments must have a moral basis such as
human rights to justify military action. I was startled by the
uniformity of this view. It worries me frankly that creating
political stability is not a sufficiently justifiable reason to go
to war. Instead, we have to discover some transcendent
ideal to justify democracies in acting.
The United States was not immune to such thinking.
Prior to NATO’s decision to launch Operation ALLIED
FORCE, there was a great deal of domestic questioning in
that regard. Thus, at the very time when we’re confronting a
world that is more tumultuous and less stable, we appear to
be experiencing an erosion of the traditional basis on which
democracies are willing to go to war. They seem to be willing
to do so only for more idealistic values. One must wonder
about the staying power of public support in this sort of
moral environment when the armed forces begin taking
casualties.
Everything thus far written in this chapter bears upon,
but does not answer, the key question—“What is the future
of the U.S. military presence in Europe?” Not having a
crystal ball, neither I nor anyone else can answer this
question except to note that it is a subset of a still broader
question—“What is America’s security posture going to be
in this sixth security epoch? Should we organize and orient
ourselves around the policies and structures which
currently are the residue of the previous epoch? Or should
we shift to something that’s radically new, something that
we don’t yet understand?”
For example, we have a vigorous debate going on in
Washington over the F-22 fighter aircraft. The F-22 is a
weapon system designed at the height of the Cold War. One
of our most defense-minded Congressional committees
decided we should live without the F-22 because its great
expense would usurp money for other essential military
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programs. Should we at the Department of Defense (DoD)
fight to get it back because it is going to be essential for
future war? Or is it an unnecessary relic of the previous
epoch whose purchase would keep us from resourcing what
we really will need for the future? These are very tough
questions. In 1997 the congressionally-created National
Defense Panel criticized DoD for remaining mired in the
Cold War past. The implication was that though we’ve
accomplished a little downsizing, we’re continuing to
maintain the same kind of force we had during the Cold
War. Moreover, according to this view, such a posture
prevents retooling in preparation for the security challenges
of the next epoch. Such criticism overlooks the fact that
more than once in the last 4 years we’ve had to mount two
nearly simultaneous operations. When will the time come
when we don’t have to worry about Korea? Or about Europe?
Certainly such worries have not been groundless in the past
decade. Thus, to repeat, the question of whether to buy for
the contingencies from the past or retool for the
uncertainties of the future is not susceptible to an easy
answer.
The foregoing question is particularly problematic as it
relates to the Army. Even though we may be in for a long
period of transition to a radically different force, we still
must confront the current challenges, which argue for
maintaining pretty much what we look like today. The U.S.
Army needs to be in Europe today because it represents the
connective tissue that holds together the security structure
of Europe.
I worry that American public support for forces in
Europe seems to be atrophying. Moreover, the Europeans
themselves seem not at all certain concerning their security
arrangements for the future. Thus, even if the U.S. Army
remains this connective tissue, what is it connecting? What
will it be connecting in 10 years? We have a national
requirement to keep our European allies firmly engaged in
the debate. This is why we are willing to talk very
intensively with them about their own defense initiatives,
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that is, where they want to have an autonomous capability
to act in the security arena apart from the United States. I’m
deeply skeptical that such autonomous capabilities will
eventuate, because the Europeans are not buying what it
takes to do that. 1 But I’m glad they’re talking about it. The
worst thing that could happen is for them to say, “We won’t
ever worry about security because the United States will
come in if the situation ever gets serious.” Such thinking
would be a very serious step in the wrong direction. Thus the
U.S. Army has to transform itself while at the same time
serving as the connective tissue holding the security
structure together in Europe for the time being.
But if the Army holds onto a nostalgic vision of its grand
past, it’s going to atrophy and die. The Army that existed
through the 1970s and 1980s and into the 1990s was one of
the finest land forces ever assembled, but simply hanging
onto a lighter, smaller version of that force for the future is
not going to work. The Army leadership that led the
downsizing in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1989 was thoroughly professional—dispassionate, forceful,
and direct. We need the same sort of resolve today, toward
the end that the Army must change itself because it cannot
simply be what it was and still be relevant to this new and
complex world emerging. But at the same time, the Army
must serve the indispensable function of holding together
the European continent, which right now is somewhat
adrift in thinking about its security requirements.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
QUESTION. In view of the perceived aversion to casualties
on the part of the American public, is it any longer realistic
to contemplate our involvement in hostilities where blood is
likely to be shed?
Dr. Hamre. I was struck by the consensus that existed
during the Kosovo operation. The skeptics believed that as
we worked our way into the campaign, we had perhaps 2 or 3
days worth of public support. They were wrong. Even before
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the CNN cameras galvanized the world with the pictures of
the terrible refugee exodus, which strengthened public
resolve, the Alliance leadership was quite solid. They
realized that there was an enormous amount at risk if the
Alliance fell apart. The necessity for Alliance cohesion will
thus lend backbone, even in the face of casualties.
With regard to our own position at home, when the
situation is serious and there is a strong consensus, America
will go to war fast and will accept casualties. The perception
that America is willing to fight only so long as nobody dies is
wrong—if war were to break out today in Korea, we’d fight
like hell. We’d take lots of casualties, but we wouldn’t give
up until we won. I’m absolutely convinced of that. But in a
contemplated military action not deeply supported by the
American people, if we proceed despite that lack of
broad-based support, we then have to conduct the war in a
way that avoids undermining whatever fragile consensus
that does exist to carry it out. And therein might be the basis
of the criticism that America is not prepared to go to war
anymore. When we as a nation are absolutely convinced
that it’s in our interest to do so, we will fight. And it doesn’t
have to be oil we’re fighting over. We’ll fight for ideas. We did
that in Kosovo. What made Kosovo so hard was that we had
never developed a profound consensus among our political
leadership over the Balkans at any time during the last 6
years. The crisis in Bosnia developed quickly, and the
military did such an efficient job there that we never had to
enter the crucible of public debate and consensus-building
on why we were there and what we were fighting for. We will
need to do better in the future.
QUESTION. Why should the United States underwrite
European security in the face of European prosperity and its
refusal to spend more on defense?
Dr. Hamre. We have a mixed picture. I think there is
basic stability in the European defense budgets. They ought
to be growing, but at least they aren’t being slashed. They
are effectively eroding, however, because the purchasing
9

power of their defense investments is badly undercut by the
structural impediments. We in the United States spend four
times as much each year on research and development
(R&D) than all of Europe combined. The European
investment is further eroded by having stovepipe
establishments that have to be resourced in every country.
We’re not immune to that. We have an Army, Navy, and Air
Force. We have an awful lot of inefficiencies in the United
States, too. But clearly there is a reduction of the value of
the annual input into R&D in Europe because it’s feeding
the beast rather than buying new knowledge. Europe has to
come to grips with that problem. It would be much better if
the United States and its European allies could jointly
tackle the R&D problem. We’ll always have a sizable
defense budget, and we’ll always be able to build a force. But
our defense industrial base is now so narrow that we can’t
generate adequate R&D competition to underpin optimum
force modernization. It would be best to tackle that problem
on a transnational basis, but I’m not optimistic that we’ll be
able to pull that off in the present environment.
QUESTION. Speaking of the power of an idea as opposed to
selfish interests as a clarion call for action, we all recall that
in November 1989 the Berlin Wall fell and the people of that
city celebrated with an all-night party in the streets. But we
should also recall that earlier in that year, during the
summer months of June through August, something else
happened that was tremendously inspiring. Young men and
women, clothes on their backs and carrying their babies,
walked out of East Germany and headed west, all in the face
of real hazards and an uncertain future. Doesn’t this exodus
illustrate the power of an idea?
Dr. Hamre. To share in your recollections, do you
remember when things were starting to fall apart in early
1989, and the Hungarian government announced that it
would no longer stop those who came from East Germany?
That it would let them emigrate to the west? Almost
overnight, 800 East Germans showed up at the West
German Embassy in Budapest, posing a major crisis. They
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had to be gotten out, so the Hungarian government rented a
train bound for West Germany and took them out—I
remember CNN was following the train across the frontier.
When the train got to Frankfurt, a CNN reporter
interviewed a young couple, with the woman holding a baby.
The reporter asked all the typical inane questions. Aren’t
you tired? Aren’t you hungry? Wasn’t this a terrible trip? Do
you know what you’re going to do? All this kind of stuff. At
the end of it, the reporter asked, “Is there anything else
you’d like to say?” The young German father said, “Yes,
there is something I’d like to say. I would like to thank
America for keeping a place in the world that is free.” That
simple but eloquent statement by the young German
captured perfectly what America had been doing for 50
years—holding up the beacon of freedom for the world’s
oppressed. Unfortunately, our post-Cold War generation
lacks an equally compelling vision. But the flame is still
there, even if it now burns less brightly, and it becomes the
task of Americans everywhere to nurture that flame, to
brighten the beacon of freedom for those less fortunate
throughout the world.
ENDNOTE - CHAPTER 1
1. The European Union, for example, seems to be talking seriously
about putting together a rapid-reaction corps of 50,000-60,000 troops,
along with supporting aircraft and warships. See “EU Pursues Its
Military Plans,” The Sentinel, Carlisle, PA, January 23, 2000, p. A8.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ROLE OF U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE
Wesley K. Clark
With NATO having just celebrated its 50th birthday,
with the 10th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall now
behind us, and with NATO’s historic coercive campaign
against Serbia now rapidly becoming grist for the military
historians’ mill, the time seems right to pause and take
stock of where the NATO Alliance stands and where it is
headed, with particular attention to the American role. In
this chapter, I shall address six broad topics: the importance
of Europe, security challenges facing NATO as it enters the
new century, the state of the NATO Alliance today,
Operation ALLIED FORCE, lessons from the recent Balkan
conflicts, and winning in the 21st century. 1
THE IMPORTANCE OF EUROPE
The figures speak volumes. U.S. trade with Europe,
amounting to over $250 billion annually, produces over
three million domestic jobs. U.S. companies employ three
million people in Europe. One in 12 factory workers in the
United States is employed by a European Union (EU) firm
operating in this country, of which there are some 4,000.
Half of the world’s goods are produced by the United States
and the EU. Ninety percent of humanitarian aid dispensed
throughout the world comes from the United States and the
EU. Companies from the EU form the largest investment
block in 41 U.S. states. Fifty-six percent of U.S. foreign
investment occurs in Europe. Europe buys 30 percent of
U.S. exports. We should note too the large oil and gas
reserves in the North Sea and particularly in the Caspian
basin that provide a strategic hedge against disruption of
supplies from the Middle East.
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What these figures reveal is the enormous degree of
economic interdependence between Europe and the United
States. The economic ties are complemented and reinforced,
of course, by political, cultural, and diplomatic ties of long
standing. The unity of vision and purpose shared by Europe
and the United States provides enormous leverage as these
partners act in concert to encourage peace and prosperity
throughout the world. Thus the maintenance of political
and economic stability in Europe remains in the forefront of
America’s national interests.
As a result of those interests, we have continued to
maintain a strong military presence in Europe, though it is
a far cry from the size of the U.S. Seventh Army at the end of
the Cold War, which amounted to 17 or 18 brigade
equivalents. So far as force structure is concerned, we have
two mechanized divisions in Germany, an airborne brigade
in Italy, a brigade-size special forces unit, and assorted
Reserve and National Guard personnel. The Air Force has
two-plus fighter wings distributed in Germany, Italy,
Turkey, and the United Kingdom, while the Navy
maintains NATO-assigned aircraft carriers in the
Mediterranean much of the time as well as a Marine
Expeditionary Unit afloat. The numbers come to 65,000
personnel for the Army, 34,000 Air Force, 10,000 Navy and
Marines, and 3,500 reserves, all embraced within a budget
of some four billion dollars.
U.S. forces in Europe, though deeply interrelated to the
NATO command structure, are not exclusively and
automatically dedicated to NATO. The distinction is
achieved through the maintenance of two separate
command structures—the United States European
Command (EUCOM) for U.S. forces and the Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) for NATO
commands—with dual-hatted commanders for several
principal elements within the two structures (see Figure 1).
For example, the commander of EUCOM also serves as
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) within
NATO. The commander of U.S. Navy Europe (NAVEUR)
14

also commands Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH) in
NATO.The commander of U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) is
in Bosnia serving as commander of NATO’s stabilization
force (SFOR).

Figure 1. U.S. European Command and NATO Command.
EUCOM serves as the backbone for many elements of
NATO, but the United States achieves additional leverage
through its command of other national forces via the device
of dual-hatting. All in all, the United States is making a
preponderant contribution to the NATO Alliance.
SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING NATO AT THE
TURN OF THE CENTURY—AND BEYOND
We remain in a period of danger. Unlike those who
believed that the end of the Cold War marked the end of
serious security challenges, NATO’s statesmen realized
immediately that we had not after all reached the end of
history. Other security problems were emerging, as they
always have over the course of time, and simple prudence
demanded that they be prepared for. But the probability of
occurrence of particular kinds of conflict is different today
than it was during the Cold War. The probability of local
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instabilities and insurgencies was quite high during the
Cold War, with the chances for intra-failed-state conflict,
regional conflict, conventional war, and the ultimate
horror—nuclear war—declining rather precipitately as one
moved toward the more violent end of the spectrum of
conflict. But in today’s security milieu, lacking the
superpower polarity that often served to impose tense order
in a confrontational world, intra-failed-state and regional
conflicts are now joining with local instabilities and
insurgencies to define the most likely forms of armed
conflict. Our task is to deal with these dangers successfully,
while preventing further movement toward the most
serious manifestations of war.
Looking further down the road, we find other security
challenges emerging. Regional instability such as we are
seeing today in the Balkans will continue to be a problem
and indeed may well intensify. The rapid proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction—particularly chemical and
biological—is becoming of paramount concern.
Transnational threats—refugee movements, terrorism,
criminal activity, environmental issues, scarcity of
resources—are shouldering forward, demanding the
attention of defense planners. The failure of democracy and
liberal reform in states of the former Soviet Union could also
pose dangerous security issues.
THE STATE OF THE ALLIANCE TODAY
In the face of such an evolving security environment,
NATO has continuously adjusted its strategic concepts so as
to remain current and relevant. NATO’s present strategic
concept, agreed upon at the Washington summit in April
1999, represents an evolutionary adaptation of post-Cold
War policy. Its hallmarks are:
• Broader appreciation of what constitutes security
interests;
• Emphasis upon deterrence and rapid response;
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• A technological imperative;
• Adoption of a European Security and Defense Identity
(ESDI) within the Alliance.
The revised strategic concept reflects a broad
appreciation of security interests, recognizing that security
is not the same thing as defense. Though we must have
collective defense as the foundation of security, members
understand that events adjacent to or near Alliance
countries can have decided impacts upon NATO security
itself.
Deterrence remains important. Though we have no
nation as adversary at this time, it is vital to retain the
means to deter the outbreak of conflict wherever it can affect
security within the Alliance. We recognize also the
essentiality of being able to respond militarily in rapid
fashion, not only within the borders of NATO countries but
also without. Accordingly, we are placing increasing
emphasis on rapid-reaction forces.
Technological advancement, of course, has never moved
faster than it is moving today. Technology offers challenges
as well as opportunities, however, for it is not easy to keep
the national militaries within the Alliance at the cutting
edge of modernization and also interoperable with each
other. It is important for the European pillar of the Alliance
to do more in this regard.
In sum, NATO’s strategic vision has evolved from a
single-minded focus on the threat from the east, as
prevailed during the Cold War, to a European Security and
Defense Identity, more expansive in concept and focused on
no identified enemy. This is what both Europe and the
United States want. It is time to halt the reduction of
resources dedicated to defense—the so-called peace
dividend—and face up to the reality that in this still
dangerous world security never comes cheap.
Though the Alliance has no standing enemy, it will in the
ebb and flow of events find its attention fixed at times on a
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particular nation or region. Such is the case today, with the
former Yugoslavia having already spawned two conflicts
that demanded NATO’s intervention and with the still
unsettled nature of events there showing every promise of
requiring long-term Alliance involvement.
In Croatia (see map at Figure 2) we have a state
attempting to become a democracy, living with the
aftermath of war, facing elections in late 1999, governed by
a hard-line party, and headed by a president whose health
problems have continued to inhibit his coming to grips with
the need for democratization in his country. In Bosnia, we
still have 30,000 NATO and associated troops on the
ground. A three-member rotating presidency is in place,
representing the Bosnian, Croat, and Serb constituencies.
Encouragingly, it held together despite the enormous
stresses imposed by the war in Kosovo. Refugees are
returning, though some remain displaced. The armed forces
are increasingly under control. A recent Balkan stability
summit brought progress in terms of calls for reductions of
those forces. But we cannot yet claim true reconciliation in
Bosnia, even though the people there are growing
accustomed to the taste of peace thanks to NATO’s work in
the region.
Montenegro, which was drawn reluctantly into the
conflict in Kosovo, remains a province of the so-called
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The president, Milo
Djukanovic, governs an uneasy coalition, with one major
coalition partner striving for independence while he himself
works to remain within the Serbia-Montenegro federation
even as he attempts to wrest concessions from Belgrade.
Albania, though not a part of the former Yugoslavia, was
caught up in the spreading Balkan problem. Its government
collapsed in early 1997, leading to intervention by Italian
forces to restore stability. After withdrawal of the Italians in
the fall of 1997, the viability of the government remained
tenuous. Then came the Kosovo crisis and the consequent
flood of refugees across the border into Albania. The
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Figure 2. Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Surrounding Region.
Albanians urgently appealed to NATO for assistance, which
was provided. Adjacent to Albania is Macedonia, formerly a
part of Yugoslavia, but now a free and democratic state. U.S.
troops have been on the ground there since 1993 as part of a
United Nations (UN) stabilization and security mission,
which correctly anticipated the subsequent flow of events.
Macedonia, despite the very real centrifugal political forces
loosed in the country, managed to hold together during the
Kosovo conflict.
Finally, of course, there are Serbia and Kosovo. In
Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic remains in power. The economy
is devastated as a result of his exposing the nation’s
instruments of production to NATO attacks. The people are
restive and concerned about the winter season now finally
receding. Milosevic is still doing his best to keep his hands
on the reins of power. At the center of all the furor is Kosovo
itself. We have there today over 30,000 NATO troops on the
ground, along with a small Russian contingent. Refugees
have flowed back in the largest spontaneous reverse
diaspora since the post-World War II era. The people have
returned, and the sorting-out process is now proceeding.
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OPERATION ALLIED FORCE
That is the situation in the Balkans as it exists today.
But let’s now flash back to the spring of 1998 to see how
NATO conceptualized its response to the emerging conflict
in Kosovo. Planning proceeded along the following strategic
axes:
• Coercive air campaign;
• Isolation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
• Humanitarian relief to refugees;
• Continued implementation of the Dayton Accords.
We had recognized on March 24, 1999, when the first
bomb dropped on Yugoslavia, that an air campaign in
isolation would not be enough to deter Slobodan Milosevic.
We also had to impose diplomatic and physical isolation on
the federal government of Yugoslavia, letting it know there
would be no succor from any quarter and that the country
would be exposed to the full brunt of NATO’s power. We also
had to make provision for humanitarian relief to refugees, a
lesson learned from Bosnia. Finally, we had to keep the lid
on in Bosnia itself, continuing to implement the Dayton
Peace Agreement signed back on November 21, 1995. Thus
the NATO headquarters was extraordinarily busy with
these multiple tasks.
Our plan was to mount a steadily escalating series of
steps designed to increase pressure on Milosevic in order to
secure heightened diplomatic, psychological, and physical
leverage. The first step was to be persuasion—diplomacy
backed by threat (discussion of the air threat occurred in
June 1998 followed by issuance of the air threat in October
1998). The second step was to be coercion—diplomacy
backed by force (the air campaign commenced on March 24,
1999, with a ground threat possible in June 1999). The third
step, should it prove necessary, would be forcible territorial
seizure and securing by ground operations as backed by
appropriate diplomacy.
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The actual implementation of the diplomacy as
contemplated above proved most instructive. We tried to
persuade President Milosevic not to use military forces
against the Kosovar rebels. He wasn’t persuaded.
Accordingly, in October 1998, NATO issued an activation
order for a forthcoming air campaign. General Klaus
Naumann, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee,
Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General, and I as SACEUR
traveled to Belgrade to confer with Milosevic on several
occasions. On October 25, we issued the air threat directly to
him, and it resulted in a respite of some 2 to 4 months in the
Kosovo fighting.
After Milosevic had signed off on his promises to NATO,
he offered us brandy and we sat around talking in a
philosophical vein. He said, “We know how to deal with the
problem of these Albanians. We’ve done this before.” We
asked where. “In the Drenica region in central Kosovo in
1946,” he told us. We asked what the solution was. He said
right out: “We killed them. We killed them all. It took
several years, but eventually we killed them all. And then
we had no problem.”
After this chilling conversation, we knew that the clock
was ticking. Sure enough, by March of the next year we were
into a campaign of coercion—diplomacy backed by force.
The intent was to—
• Attack, disrupt, and degrade current Serb military
operations;
• Deter any further aggressive Serb actions;
• Degrade Serb military potential.
It was vitally important that the air campaign—fittingly
called Operation ALLIED FORCE—be a success.
Accordingly, we established several goals to satisfy our
notion of success, calling them measures of merit:
• Avoid losses;
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• Impact Serb forces in Kosovo (and associated targets
throughout FRY);
• Minimize collateral damage;
• Maintain alliance cohesion.
Each of these goals was important. It was paramount
that we avoid losses. Why? Because in an air campaign you
don’t want to lose aircraft. When you start to lose these
expensive machines the countdown starts against you. The
headlines begin to shout, “NATO loses second aircraft,” and
the people ask, “How long can this go on?” The answer had to
be, “It can go on indefinitely, whatever time it takes to
compel Milosevic to comply with the will of the international
community.” But all realized it could not go on indefinitely if
we were suffering a succession of aircraft losses. Moreover,
the same argument applied if we were losing air crewmen.
Thus the extraordinary steps to avoid losses.
So far as the other measures of success were concerned,
obviously we had to hit, hurt, and inhibit the Serb forces in
Kosovo because Serbian actions there were the casus belli
itself. Of course, we wanted to strike hard at the strategic
and infrastructure targets throughout the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, but the attacks on these fixed targets were
relatively easy compared to gripping the tactical forces
themselves. It was unheard-of for an air component to wage
a full and successful tactical campaign against fielded land
forces without benefit of a ground component. We knew it
would be a huge challenge, particularly given the
topographical and vegetative features of the terrain, which
lent themselves to enemy cover, concealment, and
camouflage.
The minimization of civilian casualties and damage to
civilian structures and property—whether Serb or
Kosovar—was very high on our priority list. This was so for
both humanitarian and political reasons. Any lack of
discrimination between legitimate military targets and
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off-limits civilian areas would have undercut our efforts to
explain what we were doing and maintain public support.
The final measure of success, no less important than the
others, was the maintenance of Alliance cohesion. In
planning and waging Operation ALLIED FORCE, it was
necessary to consider the views and sensitivities of Alliance
members because a united effort over the long haul was an
essential precondition for achievement of military and
political goals.
Operation ALLIED FORCE consisted of two
simultaneous air lines of operation—a strategic attack on
Serbia itself and a tactical attack in Kosovo. The strategic
attack targeted Serbia’s integrated air defenses, command
and control structures, Yugoslav army and Ministry of
Interior forces, war-sustaining infrastructure and
resources, and military supply routes. In Kosovo, the
attacks were designed to degrade, isolate, and interdict
Serbian forces.
From the inception of the air campaign, it was our
intention to make it serious, sustained, and intensifying.
Between kick-off on March 24 and termination on June 9,
the total number of aircraft employed almost tripled—from
366 to 912 (Figure 3). These figures would have risen still
further had Milosevic not capitulated when he did. Early in
the campaign, reporters kept asking us how many sorties
and how many strikes were launched, showing an almost
endless fascination with the numbers. To accommodate
them, we kept tabs. The final figures revealed over 37,000
sorties, with almost 11,000 strike sorties flown and over
23,000 bombs and missiles launched (Figure 4).
Looking at the number of strike sorties as they were
distributed over the course of the campaign, we see that the
manned aircraft strike sorties increased from about 100 per
day in the beginning to close to 500 on some days in the
latter stage (Figure 5). The figures varied day by day
depending on weather conditions and the nature of the
targets. We used a lot of cruise missiles early in the
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Beginning
24 March

Ending
10 June

Strike

121

355

Air to Air

561

20

Reconnaissance/Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles

26

72

Suppression of Enemy Air
Defenses/Jamming

55

74

Tanker

66

228

Other Support

42

63

Total Aircraft

366

912

10

17

Cruise Missile Platforms

Figure 3. Growth of Air Assets
Total Sorties Flown................ 37,465
Strike Sorties Flown............... 10,808
Ordnance Expended
• 23,000+ Bombs and Missiles
• 35% Precision-Guided Munitions
• 329 Cruise Missiles
Figure 4. Air Operations Snapshot.
campaign when the targets were more suitable, but
discontinued their use later. Out of all the devastation from
the air implicit in the foregoing numbers,there were only 20
incidents of significant collateral damage. I don’t believe
any other air campaign in history achieved this degree of
precision.
The air staffers who planned those missions and the
airmen who flew them did an absolutely superb job. The
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Figure 5. Strike Sorties by Date.
men and women who flew our aircraft daily into the skies
over Yugoslavia are the real heroes of this campaign. They
are for the most part anonymous. Their identities were kept
confidential to avoid putting their families at risk. But they
flew over Yugoslavia day after day, night after night, facing
continuous antiaircraft missile fire. Despite the fact that
none of our pilots lost their lives, there were numerous close
encounters in which aircraft were banged up and almost
lost. It was a tough fighting environment, and the success of
our pilots is a great testament to their skill and courage.
We need to ask ourselves why the war ended when it did.
Why did Milosevic toss in the towel? The best explanation is
that he had finally run out of options. Early on, he had any
number of hopes. Maybe NATO would not muster the will to
bomb despite its threats to do so. If NATO did send bombers,
maybe he could shoot them down in politically telling
numbers. Or maybe the bombs wouldn’t be accurate and he
could absorb them. Maybe he could embarrass the Alliance
so that domestic support would erode and cohesion
disappear. Maybe other nations would rally to his side and
provide assistance. Maybe he would defeat the Kosovar
forces and all resistance would collapse. Maybe he could
destabilize the entire region and NATO would be too
distracted to focus on Serbia. But in the end all those
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maybes came to naught. The only option left to him was to
accept NATO’s conditions. He waited until the last possible
time to accept those conditions and still have a chance to
retain power. That was his cold calculation, explaining
why—despite telling General Naumann and me in January
1999 that keeping Kosovo was more important than saving
his head—in the end he gave up Kosovo in an attempt to
save his head.
LESSONS FROM THE BALKAN CONFLICTS
What did we learn from the Kosovo experience? First, it
became apparent that rapid, sustained, and detailed
planning was an absolute must. As mentioned earlier,
starting in the spring of 1998 NATO headquarters
commenced detailed planning, constantly updating
provisional plans in the light of breaking events, and it
continued such work at a feverish pace virtually non-stop
through the end of September. Second, we learned that
contrary to expectations, NATO even in post-Cold War
Europe must maintain real warfighting capabilities: rapid
reaction forces with deployable command and control;
Alliance intelligence fusion; air-ground reconnaissance;
all-weather, full-spectrum engagement capabilities; and
interoperable, survivable, sustainable forces.
In particular, intelligence had to be available, not just
strategic warning indicators but hard data for immediate
targeting. To accomplish this, we had to use air to conduct
reconnaissance of the ground. The ideal instrument for this
mission proved to be unmanned aerial vehicles, which we
deployed and used effectively for the first time in combat.
Also, we had to be able to engage the enemy, not just in the
bright, clear weather conditions like those in the American
southwest where U.S. forces train, but also in the soup,
where visibility was poor or nonexistent. In short, Kosovo
confronted NATO and the men and women who served in its
forces with a real warfighting experience.
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I’d also like to glance at a few of the lessons drawn from
Bosnia, because what we’ve been doing in Bosnia for some
time has relevance to our present task in Kosovo. Many
have an impression of peacekeeping as consisting of soldiers
patrolling along a cease-fire line, driving back and forth in
jeeps while exuding good will to the locals. But the reality in
Bosnia is quite different, presenting a far more complex
picture than simple peacekeeping. By way of example,
consider three vignettes: the Serb “rally” at Banja Luka; the
seizure of Serb radio-television transmission towers; and an
unfortunate incident involving returning Serbs at Drvar.
On September 6, 1997, just before the local Bosnian
elections, the hard-line parties in the Republika Srpska
(Serb Republic) announced a special Republika-wide “rally”
for the election in Banja Luka. We knew that the gathering
was more than a mere rally because the day before we had
seized a cache of police uniforms and weapons. There was
thus very good reason to believe that this so-called peaceful
rally was in fact dedicated to overthrowing the moderate
Serb Co-President, Biljana Plavsic. The situation presented
a tricky military problem, because how can peacekeeping
forces properly take action against what is represented as a
democratic rally? The call had gone out for all “courageous
and intelligent Serbs” to get on a bus, travel to Banja Luka,
and be with their brothers—and get paid 200 to 400
Deutsche marks for the experience. From all over Bosnia,
250 busses loaded up and started to move.
In the meanwhile, as we worked to coalesce political
opinion against the rally on the basis that it represented a
threat to democracy and stability in Republika Srpska, we
were able to delay the arrival of the busses using nonlethal
means. We successfully fostered broad public sentiment
that the rally was not only unnecessary but illegal and
threatening as well. And so it came about that by about 6:00
p.m. on September 8, the rally was effectively banned by
Bosnian Serb police.
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The hard-line Serb leader Momcilo Krajisnik attempted
to hold the rally anyway. He stood in the square with 400
supporters, surrounded by 1,500 hostile Serbs who
supported the moderate Serb president Madam Plavsic, and
was literally booted off the stage. He took refuge in a nearby
hotel, and the next day Milosevic called me, saying, “You
must protect his life.” We asked, “Who’s in the hotel with
him?” Milosevic said, “Oh, just some armed guards and
other people. But he is in danger, he is president, and he
must be treated with respect.” NATO thus found itself in the
position of assisting and protecting the very same hard-line
Bosnian Serb leader who had been a consistent opponent of
NATO forces. The episode was the gravest defeat of radical
Serb forces in the entire 5-year campaign, and it was
inflicted by other Bosnian Serb forces assisted by NATO.
The Banja Luka incident demonstrated that if
peacekeeping forces have mobility, information superiority,
interoperability, and sublethal means of engagement, they
can win in situations where nobody even knows there’s been
a fight.
The second illustrative peacekeeping vignette from
Bosnia relates to the disruptive influence of Serb radio and
television. A few weeks after the incident in Banja Luka,
Carlos Westendorp, the EU Peace Envoy and High
Representative in Bosnia, called me and said, “You’ve got to
help me with Serb radio-television—it’s undercutting
democracy.” Under the authority provided by the North
Atlantic Council, I spoke to Secretary General Javier
Solana, and we agreed that we would seize control of the
television transmission towers at Duga Niva, Udrigovo,
Trebevic, and Leotar.
The planning began at 7:00 p.m. on the evening of
September 30, 1997, in SFOR headquarters. The order to
execute went out after midnight, and at 5:00 a.m. the next
morning, Italian, Spanish, and U.S. forces moved out to take
the towers, each of which was guarded by a small Serb
contingent. We knew the routes and moved to each site with
an overwhelming display of force, knocked on the door of the
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security huts, and said simply, “Why don’t you come out and
join us for breakfast—we have some hot coffee.” The Serbs
looked at our tanks and armored personnel carriers,
glanced at their puny AK-47s, and then said, “We’d love
some hot coffee!” They walked away from the towers, and
that was it. The operation attracted virtually no headlines
but had a huge favorable impact in Bosnia. The key lessons
were the need for rapid and flexible planning, interoperability, effective engagement capability, mobility, and
survivability.
The final illustrative vignette from Bosnia occurred on
April 24, 1998, even as the situation in Kosovo was heating
up. It did not work out successfully like the earlier two. It
was our policy to encourage all minority refugees to return
to the home areas from which they had fled. In Drvar, a
group of hard-line Croats decided they would get rid of the
returning Serbs. Outside Croats, unfamiliar to us and the
local authorities, infiltrated the town and gathered into an
unruly crowd. They produced incendiary devices and
proceeded to burn some 100 Serb homes plus several
vehicles, moving along planned routes. The Canadian
battalion responded, but only after the crowd had begun to
leave. Lacking nonlethal capabilities, the battalion would
have been unable to prevent the violence within acceptable
limits of coercion.
The result was a huge setback for the refugee
repatriation effort in Bosnia. It stopped the endeavor almost
cold for 9 months, giving hard-line leaders on all sides new
life and encouragement. In drawing lessons from the Drvar
incident, we find affirmed the essentiality of local
intelligence, sublethal engagement capability,
interoperability, and rapid response, all of which were
lacking or inadequate in this instance. NATO is engaged in
a continuous process of analyzing its Balkan operations,
drawing the relevant lessons and disseminating them
through national channels. We will doubtless confront
similar challenges again in the future.

29

On a more general level, a paramount lesson we derive
from the Balkan experience is the incredible complexity of
military operations. Every decision, every act, every event
reverberates with tactical, operational, strategic, and
political implications. The military commander must attend
to all four. No matter how small or insignificant an event
may seem in the traditional military sense, the commander
will discover that in today’s security milieu that minor event
may suddenly become the object of consuming interest at
the highest councils of state.
WINNING IN THE 21st CENTURY
Looking ahead into the next century, we see a growing
need for rapid-reaction forces within the Alliance. Though
we must retain main defense forces as a hedge against
uncertainty—against the worst possible contingencies—we
are going to have to acquire the tools to deal with the far
more likely crisis and conflict scenarios outside of NATO
territory. Thus there will be a strong new effort to
strengthen the reaction forces in NATO member nations,
forces that can be moved quickly to deal with local
instabilities and insurgencies, failed-state situations, and
regional conflicts in areas that can affect NATO security.
At the Washington summit, NATO members adopted
the Defense Capabilities Initiative, conceived to produce
reaction forces that can respond to any possible challenge by
overmatching the opponent in size, technology, readiness,
and training. These reaction forces would possess
information superiority, interoperability, sustainability,
broad-spectrum engagement capability, survivability, and
mobility. This is what it will take to win NATO’s battles in
the next century, and I believe we’re on track to obtain such
capabilities. NATO’s force goals and force planning process,
guided by the concept of a European Security and Defense
Identity, will produce the forces we need to implement
NATO’s new strategic concept.
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Clearly, European security remains vital to U.S.
interests, and we can never safely remain indifferent to
security in that region out of a misbegotten yearning to
return to the isolationism of the 1930s. In pursuing its
policy of engagement, it is critical for the United States to
work through NATO so as to benefit from the huge leverage
that such association brings. However, it is inevitable and
proper that both NATO and the NATO-U.S. relationship
continue to evolve over time. Evolution and adaptation of
the comfortable security fixtures of the past should be no
cause for concern, for through such prudent adjustments we
equip ourselves to confront the flux of events that time shall
surely bring.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
QUESTION. I’d like to ask a question not about the Balkan
states but rather about the Baltic states. A member of the
U.S. State Department who was recently in the Baltic states
is reported to have said that their membership in NATO is
practically inevitable. If that took place, how would you
uphold NATO’s treaty obligations to protect those states
from armed attack (North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5), and
would that involve specifically the deployment of U.S. and
NATO troops and/or nuclear weapons?
General Clark. I’m not going to speculate on hypothetical
or prospective military activities in the form asked, but I
will make a couple of points in response to your question.
First, the Alliance leaders have said that the door to further
NATO accession remains open. The Baltic countries are
among those earnestly seeking to join NATO. I was in
Lithuania and Latvia recently and had very good
consultations with their leadership. They are making real
headway in terms of transforming and creating armed
forces that could be interoperable with NATO. NATO’s
policy in the past has been to first be sure that democratic
conditions are met before NATO membership is granted.
The Baltics are doing quite well in that regard. We’ve also
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said that we want to help them through the membership
action plan to become interoperable, and they are working
in that direction also. But the decision to extend invitations
for membership is a political decision which I couldn’t
comment on. Nor could I comment on any hypothetical
Article 5 operations or deployments except to note that in
the case of the accessions of the first three
countries—Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary—
we’ve said that there would not be a need for NATO forward
deployments there, certainly not nuclear weapons. Nor
would there be any large NATO headquarters in those
countries.
We’re not trying to re-create the division of Germany and
move it further east. It is of fundamental importance to
understand what NATO leaders have always told Klaus
Naumann and me: NATO is first and foremost a political
alliance, not a military alliance. It has a broad program of
outreach at multiple levels to provide assurance and
stability throughout Europe. It does this through
partnerships for peace, through scientific exchanges, and
through conferences, dialogue, and multiple forms of
cooperation. It extends assurances of security, it provides
hope, it provides a basis for people in these formerly
turbulent regions of eastern Europe to believe that in the
future they will achieve the stability needed to attract
international investment in their countries. This stability
and security form the essential bedrock for all the other
reforms, hopes, and dreams that these societies have. Thus
NATO is a political alliance first and foremost, with a
military component among many others.
QUESTION. I’d like to ask about Task Force Hawk, the
U.S. Apache helicopter and support contingent. According
to the newspapers, the United States provided Task Force
Hawk to NATO, but never gave it release authority for
employment. Can you comment on countries providing
forces, but then not allowing them to be used.
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General Clark. Every country that provides forces to
NATO normally places conditions on their use. In this case,
the decision was made to deploy with a possibility later of
employment. That decision to employ was never made, and
thus the authority was not passed to NATO.
Task Force Hawk, however, got there in a very effective
way, even though it didn’t meet the early expectations for
timelines that had been publicly announced. Originally,
Task Force Hawk was to be deployed into Macedonia, but at
the very time when we made the decision to deploy, the
well-publicized wave of refugees began flooding into
Macedonia, producing a potentially destabilizing
humanitarian crisis there as well as in Albania. The
decision was then made to shift its location from Macedonia
to Albania. This necessitated a much larger force package
because of the geography and other conditions in Albania.
That increase in turn extended the deployment timelines.
Our troops did an excellent job of moving and setting up on
the airfield near Tirana.
Task Force Hawk made an enormous contribution to the
outcome of the war. Its arrival on the ground signaled a real
determination to succeed. The people and government of
Albania immediately recognized it for what it was. Task
Force Hawk represented the United States and
NATO—they were visibly there in Albania with boots on the
ground. As a result of that, the army of Albania continued to
strengthen its performance, it moved to the frontier, it
protected its own border. Moreover, it encouraged the
people of Albania to deal pragmatically with the other
problems in their country. It provided key intelligence and
planning data as we moved into the final days of the air
campaign. It was a superb effort.
We were all crushed by the tragic loss of our two Apache
helicopter pilots who went down on a training mission in
Albania. But I can’t say enough for the character and the
courage of the men and women of Task Force Hawk, who
moved in there rapidly in a difficult environment, trained
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up to speed in unfamiliar surroundings, and in that process
made a profound contribution to the successful outcome of
the campaign.
QUESTION. When the war in the Balkans began, many
believed that air power would never win the war. But in
retrospect, it appears to have done so. Judging from reports
in the news media, a larger role for the Air Force is in the
offing because of its mounting utility in winning wars. Are
you willing to accept that the Air Force has now become our
favorite tool for fighting wars?
General Clark. We know, first of all, that this wasn’t
really a war. We call it a war, and for the men and women
who flew over Belgrade I guarantee you it was a war. But in
terms of foregoing all hopes for a diplomatic outcome and
instead simply crushing the enemy, no we didn’t do that. We
operated on multiple levels throughout this campaign. We
isolated Milosevic, we stabilized the countries in the region,
we kept the lid on in Bosnia, we applied pressure through
the air campaign, we kept our NATO resolve intact. All
along, we said we are winning, Milosevic is losing, and he
knows it. He knew it because he couldn’t touch our aircraft,
he couldn’t protect his equipment on the ground, and the
end was obvious and inevitable. Ultimately, therefore, he
conceded. But in an air campaign like this, there was never
some specific criterion, some predictable level of damage, at
which we were assured of attaining the desired result. Thus
we always said that the air campaign was working, it was on
track, but we wanted to be sure that we had the opportunity,
if necessary, to do other things as well.
When I look at the campaign in retrospect, I see the
tremendous contribution made by Task Force Hawk, the
significant impact of the Kosovo Liberation Army in
flushing out the Serbs during the last weeks of the
campaign, and the effective use of air power. I thus believe
the old rule is still the right rule—that it takes a balanced
mix of capabilities to wage modern war and that these
various capabilities must be exploited in differing degrees
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and combinations depending on the specific political and
military circumstances at hand. The result in Operation
ALLIED FORCE demonstrates that we did exactly that.
QUESTION. How did you come up with the measures for
success in gauging the success of Operation ALLIED
FORCE?
General Clark. If you look at the measures of success—I
prefer to call them measures of merit—you’ll note that not
one of the measures could be accomplished totally or
absolutely, but only to a certain degree depending on the
trade-offs we chose to accept. Are we doing enough to avoid
friendly aircraft losses while still striking Serb forces
effectively on the ground? Are we striking his infrastructure
and forces on the ground hard enough or do we have to back
off a little bit to minimize further collateral damage? If we’re
striking too hard, if we’re causing too many problems, are
we risking Alliance cohesion? All of these measures of merit
were fundamentally at odds with each other, because the
considerations in determining how to design the campaign
and how to work it on a day-to-day basis are so difficult and
complex. In retrospect, we made many calls that could have
gone another way, but one of the things I learned a long time
ago at the National Training Center is that there’s no single
best way, there’s no single best plan. There are just two
kinds of plans, two kinds of ways—those that might work
and those that won’t work. You have to pick a way that
might work, and then you make it work. That’s what NATO
did.
QUESTION. Have you determined the cause of the loss of
the Stealth bomber?
General Clark. An investigation has been accomplished,
but I’m not at liberty to discuss the details of it here because
Stealth is a classified platform. We have gone through the
mechanics and we know pretty much what happened. We
remain very confident in our equipment and we’re very
confident in our pilots. I want to say one more time in
conclusion how proud all of us should be of the men and
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women in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines who were
there in the air and on the ground in this very ambiguous
situation. They did a great job for our country and for
NATO. They’re the heroes of this campaign and I salute
each and every one of them and will never forget them. I
made trip after trip to Italy, Albania, and Macedonia, and it
was an inspiration to meet our young troops, to witness the
innovation, the positive attitude, the dedication, the
determination to succeed. The pilots that flew over Kosovo
and watched the burning and the mayhem everyday knew
better than anybody else what this campaign was about.
They were determined to succeed. And they did.
ENDNOTE - CHAPTER 2
1. This chapter, under the title “The United States and NATO: The
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Parameters, Vol. 29, Winter 1999-2000, pp. 2-14.
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CHAPTER 3
STAYING IN EUROPE:
A VITAL AMERICAN INTEREST
Klaus Naumann
To approach the question of America’s future military
presence in Europe, I shall begin with a brief glance at the
situation as I see it today. True, the United States is the only
superpower left—economically, politically, strategically,
militarily—indeed, it is militarily stronger than ever.
Washington is at present actively involved in conflicts in
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. But despite such
American power projection into overseas areas, despite
American involvement in foreign political, economic, and
military affairs, it remains, to quote Samuel Huntington, “A
lonely superpower that can’t do much alone.” The United
States needs a global partner who can act together with
Washington as a global power. Such a new conception of
partnership is required to deal with old and new challenges
of the multipolar post-Cold War environment. The
post-Cold War turmoil in the Balkans, the eternal
Turkish-Greek-Cyprus crisis, the situations in the Middle
East, India, and Pakistan, as well as a new Russian-Chinese
rapprochement, are some of the hallmarks of this new
world, and in responding to them alone the United States
would find even its vaunted power stretched too thin.
The Chinese and Russian defense ministers now meet on
a regular basis. Beijing’s military procurement policy is
undoubtedly favorable to Russian products. Former
Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov in his visit to
Delhi in December 1998 proposed a trilateral relationship
among Russia, China, and India. The Chinese premier Zhu
Rongji and Russian president Boris Yeltsin stressed during
their meeting in February 1999 in Moscow the necessity of
increasing political, economic, and military cooperation.
They clearly expressed a preference for a multipolar world,
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rejecting the idea of domination by the United States. These
developments should be watched carefully. True, both
Beijing and Moscow are weak at this time. But that might
change in the next 10 to 15 years. I am sure it will change as
far as China is concerned.
A complicating factor is that we shall be confronted with
the simultaneous presence of three different forms of
societies and their concomitant forms of war—pre-modern,
modern, and post-modern. This is a new development
suggesting that no single nation—not even the United
States—can any longer pursue national security
unilaterally. The multifaceted, multidirectional threats we
face at the beginning of the third millennium will require
responses by alliances. We will be confronted with nonstate
actors who will use military weapons. We will see
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including the
most dangerous one, biological weapons. And we might even
see opponents who use information warfare to paralyze our
very vulnerable modern societies.
We are about to enter a world that will be less
predictable and less stable than the bipolar world which we
brought successfully to an end in 1989. And we will see a
world containing another novelty: the United States of
America, the only superpower, will be vulnerable to attacks
by nonstate actors. Again, America will need a partner. But
why should it be Europe, a continent striving to achieve
unity but which is far from speaking with one voice. The
selection of a strategic partner is based on a nation’s
strategic interest. Why is Europe important to the United
States?
Europe is of strategic importance because three of the
most important and difficult challenges at the beginning of
the 21st century can be successfully tackled only if Europe
and the United States cooperate more closely than ever
before. These three challenges are, first, to manage Russia’s
weakness; second, to contain the new risks and the new
reasons for conflict; and third, to halt the proliferation of
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weapons of mass destruction. Let us address each of these
three challenges in turn.
First Russia. Russia’s transformation is far from
complete. At the moment, Russia is not yet a true democracy
nor are there signs of lasting economic stability. The
Russian elites still believe their country to be number two in
the world, although their gross national product equals that
of Denmark. They continue to believe military power can
imbue Russia with global importance. Perhaps that is the
reason for what I would call the coup of Pristina, where
Russia without prior announcement landed a 200-man
contingent in the wake of Operation ALLIED FORCE in
order to forge a role in the Kosovo peacekeeping effort. They
increasingly believe they must rely on nuclear weapons to
compensate for their weakness. We have to deal with the
wounded psyche of a continental power that failed to
understand it was confronted by a military alliance called
NATO. The Russians have wanted veto rights over NATO
actions in Europe, and they had to learn during the Kosovo
crisis that while NATO was willing to inform them of
contemplated actions, it would not grant them any rights of
co-decision. This stance will likely be maintained. No one
can predict Russia’s future with certainty. Its
disintegration is as possible as its resurrection as a global
player during the first half of the 21st century. The greater
danger at this moment, however, is the disintegration of
Russia.
We need to cooperate with Russia and give her
assistance. To this end we need a coordinated European and
American approach, which in my view could best be handled
by NATO. The task is simply too big for either Europe or the
United States acting alone. And without managing the
Russian problem, we will never have stability in Europe,
nor indeed in the world.
Challenge number two: we need to keep the new risks
under control and prevent new forms of conflict. To that end
we’ll again need close U.S.-European cooperation. Two of
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the most likely reasons for conflict at this time are mass
human migrations and the shortage of water as a
consequence of ever increasing populations. At the
beginning of the 1980s, we had some 11 million refugees on
our globe. Today we are approaching the 30 million mark.
We learned in Kosovo how quickly refugees can be used to
destabilize countries. According to a study commissioned by
the United Nations, by the year 2050 approximately 25
percent of our world’s population will suffer from a severe
shortage of water. People have killed each other for lesser
grievances than a shortage of water.
Confronted with these new risk-laden reasons for
conflict, we have to work together to mitigate tensions and
resolve grievances. People who have nothing to lose can
easily be seduced by a ruthless regime. Neither the United
States nor Europe can cope with this problem alone, since
neither electorate has a keen interest in what they see as a
remote and rather unlikely danger. The United States and
Europe are the only players who realistically could hope to
resolve such problems, and even then only by joining forces.
To this end, we need a well-coordinated effort to keep
regional instabilities from growing into global instability
that could engulf us all.
Challenge number three: so far as proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction is concerned, we need a global
effort. But such a comprehensive effort is practicable only if
we execute it in a steady, incremental way, as is the present
approach, rather than demanding sudden giant bounds.
Most nations are simply not aware how urgent the problem
is and thus will be unprepared to acquiesce in draconian
solutions. It is particularly important to prevent what I
would call “soft” proliferation, that is, the acquisition of
weapons of mass destruction by rogue states that hire
dispossessed weapons scientists and engineers who carry
blueprints for such weapons in the back of their minds.
There is no hope of preventing any of the various forms of
proliferation unless the United States and Europe take
common action. What seems obvious is that Europe and the
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United States need each other as partners to find any
solution at all.
The three global challenges discussed above matter for
both the United States and Europe. They require
cooperation, not isolated approaches. Europe, of course, is
not as militarily strong as it should be. But it is a reliable
and by and large predictable partner. If the United States
looks around at potential partners, it will not often find
among them these qualifications—reliability and
predictability. Furthermore, Europe is a partner who
shares the same values as the United States, a rare quality
among America’s partners around the globe.
I conclude therefore that the European continent is still
of strategic importance to the United States. Without
Europe, there is little to no chance to keep the risks to
America at a distance. And unless those risks are kept at a
distance, the vulnerability of the United States will increase
as well. On the opposite side—and let me be absolutely clear
on this—without the United States in Europe, there is
neither security nor stability in Europe itself. For quite a
time to come, Europe cannot do without the American
presence.
But there are other security interests at stake.
Economically the United States still finds an important
export market in Europe, a region in which American firms
have invested considerable money and on which thousands
of domestic jobs depend. The proposition also works in
reverse, with Europe similarly dependent upon the United
Sates. Europe and the United States need economic
cooperation in order to remain competitive in the Asian
market in the 21st century. America’s economists know that
better than its defense establishment does. They realize
that Europe forms a gateway for the American economy to
Eastern Europe, to Russia, and to the Central Asian
countries ranging from Turkmenistan to Kazakhstan.
These places are potentially areas where consumer goods
may be in high demand if everything goes well. But business
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will never invest there if security is lacking. American and
European cooperation in enhancing such security could
create the prerequisites for business investment in an
emerging marketplace in this enormous region east of the
NATO Treaty area.
Moreover, for Americans cooperation between the
United States and Europe opens the door to the European
Union (EU), securing for them a certain measure of
influence on this organization, which is, after all, an
economic competitor of the United States. A continuing
American presence in Europe enhances such influence and
allows both parties to better exploit the potential of the
EU-U.S. declaration on trade.
But there are at least three other strategic reasons that
speak for an ongoing American presence in Europe, the first
being the geostrategic factor. The United States as a global
and maritime power needs free access to the coastlines on
both sides of the Atlantic. The Europeans offer control of the
European coastline through America’s participation in
NATO and through their preparedness to host American
contingents in Europe. Thus, if I understand my Alfred
Mahan properly, an American presence in Europe is in
America’s strategic self-interest since it allows the United
States to protect vital sea lines of communications.
Second, as I intimated earlier, we need to keep conflicts
at a distance, which means that a European-American
nexus can continue to serve as a launch pad for U.S.
strategic deployments. Reflecting on the Balkan
deployments and their promise of being prolonged, we note
that the customary stationing of U.S. troops in Europe
offers a cost-effective solution. It is far cheaper than
temporary deployments from the States, and it is leveraged
by the concomitant political influence.
Enhanced American influence beyond the Europe of the
EU is a third strategic benefit of a continued U.S. presence.
With American forces on the continent, the United States
has a cost-effective solution for Partnership for Peace (PfP)
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activities, which, by promoting unit-to-unit contacts
between U.S. forces and those outside NATO, are one of the
better investments in stability and outreach.
For all the foregoing reasons, I regard a strong American
presence in Europe as serving U.S. strategic interests well,
and as being indispensable for the Europeans. Moreover,
there are potential benefits for other areas of the world since
Europe is a true prerequisite of American global power
projection capability. Let’s be absolutely candid: without an
American presence in Europe, the United States will never
have the same clout in NATO as it has right now.
Taking into account that all future conflicts will require
coalition efforts, a U.S. presence in Europe is an investment
in winning the European support which after all is still the
most reliable support the United States can get. But to
maintain a substantial military presence in the absence of
an existing threat is possible only if the Europeans are
taking their fair share of the common defense burdens on
their shoulders. The Europeans know that they have to do
more. They will be slow in doing this, but they will do it in
the end. Americans should not forget that the Europeans
are doing something which is rarely mentioned in the
familiar burden-sharing debates—they are investing a
great deal in stabilizing the Eastern European and Russian
situation.
The Europeans also know that military intervention
requires the resoluteness to see it through once the decision
is taken to go down that road. They harbor no illusion that
you can win a war based on air power and technology alone.
They know that in every conflict there is a need for boots on
the ground at the end of the day. And they know that there
will never be an intervention which you can guarantee will
be casualty-free. The Europeans will in all likelihood
remain slow in jumping on the military bandwagon during a
crisis. But as soon as they are aboard, they will see it
through. Kosovo has clearly shown that. After all, it was the
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cohesion of NATO that made Milosevic and the Russians
blink.
Europeans wish to remain America’s partner, and they
invite their friend to keep up its military presence in
Europe, which secures its influence on the EU in a way
second to none. The case for a continued robust U.S.
presence in Europe is strong and the arguments are
compelling. Let me review four points to underlie this
statement. First, the American military presence in Europe
means true forward defense of the United States and
ensures the vital control of sea lines of communications.
Second, the American presence strengthens a unique
alliance, NATO, which is, after all, the only alliance in
which all nations share the same values. Third, such a
presence enhances American strategic flexibility, serving to
extend U.S. global reach. And fourth, the American
presence in Europe ties together the two most potent
economic areas. This link will lead over time to increased
cooperation and the reduction of competition. The result
could be an economic global dominance that no one could
challenge. An American presence on the continent best
serves U.S. strategic interests and will continue to do so for
the foreseeable future.
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CHAPTER 4
AMERICA’S STANCE TOWARD EUROPE:
MOVING AWAY FROM A NATO-CENTERED
POLICY
Ted Galen Carpenter
Let’s concede at the outset that Europe is still
strategically important to the United States. But in what
way or ways? Certainly not in the narrowest sense. After all,
the United States, given its strategic nuclear deterrent and
its other military and economic capabilities, could have
survived Europe’s fall during the Cold War. It would have
been a far less pleasant world for the United States, but
nonetheless the survival of a free and democratic Western
Europe during that period was not the equivalent of the
survival of the United States. It was important, it was not
indispensable, and it is important to make such nuanced
distinctions in today’s world.
A few years ago, when he was Assistant Secretary of
State, Richard Holbrooke wrote that “the United States has
become a European power” and that we should therefore act
in that fashion. 1 On this issue, as on many others, Richard
Holbrooke is dead wrong. The United States is not a
European power. The United States is an external power
that has some important European interests. That is a
subtle but very important distinction. Because if Holbrooke
were right, the United States, as a European power, indeed
as the leading European power, would have to be as
concerned as every other significant European power about
every development that takes place anywhere in Europe.
That is expecting far too much from us. It is not a
sustainable policy.
We need to be more rigorous in our thinking about what
America’s important European interests are. Anyone can
identify a number of them, but three stand out that have a
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particularly enduring quality about them. The first is that
we want no single power to dominate the continent. We do
not want a European hegemon, particularly if that power is
hostile to the United States. But, to be blunt about it, we do
not want such a hegemon even if it were not hostile to the
United States. In shorthand terms, we do not want a
repetition of 1939 when Germany made a bid for continental
domination. The second important interest is that Europe’s
great powers remain at peace with one another. The
shorthand version of this interest is that we don’t want any
repetition of 1914. And a third important interest, in large
part flowing from the other two, is that we want Europe to
be a reasonably stable arena for American trade and
investment. Thus we have to have a certain measure of
stability on the continent. But again, nuance is important.
What we’re seeking here is general stability,
macro-stability, if you will, on the continent. That should
not be confused with the completely unattainable goal of
micro-stability, where we seek stability everywhere on the
continent, at all times, in every single country. That is
simply not a feasible goal in any region as diverse as Europe.
I would be the first to concede that NATO as an
institutional mechanism does secure America’s important
European interests, and that is a powerful argument for
retaining the Alliance. But I would also argue that the
NATO-centered policy has too many undesirable side effects
for the United States in a post-Cold War strategic setting.
To protect our important interests in Europe, we are
increasingly being drawn into marginal or even irrelevant
disputes and problems.
Henry Kissinger put this very well on the eve of NATO’s
military operations against Serbia. Expressing the
frustration that more and more Americans share—in
Congress, in the foreign policy community, and in the
general public—he asked, “Why is it that the United States
is expected to use military force to deal with a problem such
as Kosovo?” He went on to say,
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The European states should be able to manage that kind of
problem, or problems of that magnitude, on their own. After
all, we didn’t expect the European members of NATO to send
troops and to take a sizable portion of the responsibility to deal
with the problem in Haiti.

The Europeans expected the United States to take care of
that problem by itself. It was in our neighborhood, it wasn’t
a hugely serious problem, and Kissinger saw Kosovo as a
European problem much in the same way that we saw Haiti
as our problem.
Such considerations underscore another problem: a
NATO-centered policy continues to encourage, as it did
during the Cold War, an unhealthy dependency mentality
on the part of the western European powers—what is often
called “free-riding.” Unfortunately, the term free-riding has
come to mean financial free-riding. European members in
NATO underinvest in defense. They free-ride on the
security guarantee provided by the United States.
But there’s a more serious aspect of our NATO-centered
policy. Such a dominant U.S. role virtually excludes the
creation of effective alternative institutions to deal with
secondary or tertiary security problems in Europe, the
kinds of security problems that Henry Kissinger was
talking about.
NATO, in that sense, is like a great oak tree that blocks
out the sun for any other plants that might grow up in its
shadow. We thus face a serious dilemma. How do we
continue to secure America’s important strategic interests
in Europe without accepting the collateral baggage of
involvement in marginal or even irrelevant disputes and
problems? That requires an entirely new strategy: the
vigorous downloading of responsibility for parochial
disputes and secondary threats to the European Union
(EU). It was one thing to argue during the Cold War that the
West European powers were incapable of neutralizing the
threat posed by a military superpower. It is quite another
matter to suggest that a region that is as populous and
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prosperous as the EU is incapable of dealing with problems
posed by the likes of Slobodan Milosevic. But the basic
lesson here is that incentives matter. We cannot expect the
West European powers to undertake great initiatives and
high responsibilities if the United States continues to allow
them to off-load a good portion of those difficult
responsibilities onto it. Again, incentives do matter.
I want to make it clear that I’m not proposing some new
burden-sharing configuration. Disputes over
burden-sharing ratios have represented the most sterile
and phony debates in the entire trans-Atlantic security
relationship. We have been down that road too many times
over the past half century. The European members of NATO
have made and broken so many promises of taking greater
initiative, of assuming greater responsibility, of making a
greater investment in defense, that no American
policymaker can give future promises any degree of respect.
I am proposing nothing less than burden-shifting. That
will entail a fundamental change in U.S. policy. I know
there are a great many objections to moving away from a
NATO-centered policy or, as some might even say, a
NATO-only policy. One is that without the U.S. military
presence, without U.S. leadership of NATO, we have the
danger of renationalization of defenses throughout Europe,
thus creating the same kind of instability, the same kinds of
rivalry, that led to the two world wars. That’s an improbable
outcome, but one can’t rule it out entirely. Josef Joffe, some
15 years ago, published an important article in Foreign
Affairs titled “Europe’s American Pacifier.” 2 He was
referring specifically to America’s stabilizing role in
preventing the renationalization of defense and the
reemergence of national rivalries. He certainly had a point,
for the America presence has had that stabilizing effect. But
I’ve always wondered if Joffe recognized the implicit double
meaning of his title. After all, a pacifier is something we give
an infant, and as a parent I can attest that some infants
cling to that pacifier as a security mechanism long after they
need to do so. They will never voluntarily relinquish it, and I
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think that is the problem we’re facing in the trans-Atlantic
relationship.
Another reason often heard for maintaining the current
structure of the trans-Atlantic security relationship is that
America’s leadership of NATO and its presence in Europe
give the United States important leverage in an array of
other issues, particularly economic issues. That belief is
widespread, but what is striking is the lack of any tangible
evidence for it. I have challenged defenders of that
proposition time and again to cite even a couple of specific
examples in which the U.S. security presence and security
leadership role caused the Europeans to make major
concessions on political or economic issues when it was not
manifestly in their own best interest to do so. I always get
this deafening silence from the proponents of the status quo.
On the other hand, one can cite many examples where
our leverage proved to be minimal to nonexistent, whether
it was trade with Cuba, the embargo against Iran, or what
have you, with the Europeans charting their own polices
based on their own wishes and their own interests in the
face of American opposition. I’m not suggesting that the
European refusals to accede to U.S. wishes were wrong. In
the case of Cuba, for example, their approach is arguably
much more intelligent than the approach adopted by the
United States. But the point is simply that there is very
little if any evidence of effective U.S. leverage. If we want a
structure that will truly protect our important European
security interests without making the United States the
babysitter of the Balkans or the future babysitter of the
Caucasus, then we need to move away from a
NATO-centered policy.
For conceptual clarity, our first step must be to
distinguish the issue of the existence of NATO and U.S.
membership in NATO, on the one hand, from the issue of a
continued U.S. military presence in Europe, on the other
hand. Though they tend to merge in the minds of many
observers, these are two separate issues. When NATO was
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created in 1949, not only was there no expectation that the
United States would have a permanent military presence in
Europe, there were explicit promises given to the U.S.
Senate and the American people that there would be no
permanent military presence because it would not be
needed. If the Truman Administration and the architects of
NATO believed that those were separate issues in 1949,
during one of the worst periods of the Cold War, then surely
they are separate issues in a post-Cold War strategic
setting.
In moving away from a NATO-centered policy, the
United States must seek to create a more narrowly focused
and informal security relationship between itself as one
contractual party and the EU as the other contractual
party. That kind of security relationship would serve as an
insurance policy against the rise, if that should happen, of a
serious mutual security threat. Right now one does not
exist. A possible model for the kind of U.S.-EU arrangement
broached here would be the NATO of 1949, a security
institution in which the United States maintained
membership, but did not provide a routine military
presence.
Defenders of the current system will decry the loss of
benefits accruing from NATO’s present integrated
command and force structure. But this structure was
created to meet a very specific threat, namely, a powerful
military force with forward-deployed forces. Europe was in
a perpetual state of crisis, confronting an expansionist great
power. Such is not the strategic setting today, nor is it the
prospective strategic setting for the foreseeable future.
Therefore, a more circumscribed, narrowly focused, and
informal security arrangement makes sense.
In short, we need a new security relationship that allows
the United States to attend to the possible emergence of a
serious mutual security threat without requiring it to
undertake burdens and responsibilities that have little to do
with its own vital security interests. I am baffled as to why
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the United States seems bent upon setting itself up in the
Balkans as a powerbroker in the mold of the old
Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. Such a role
should appeal only to a masochist, and undertaking it is
certainly not essential for the security and well-being of the
United States. Furthermore, over the long haul the
undertaking is unsustainable.
The American people are skeptical about our current
posture in Europe, to put it mildly. The first time we
encounter substantial casualties, support in the Congress
and in the public is likely to evaporate. At that point,
policymakers would need to worry about the extent of the
backlash. Such a backlash could carry over to wanting to
reject the overall security relationship with Europe. That is
the danger that those who cling to the status quo are
courting.
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CHAPTER 5
EUROPE AS A STRATEGIC STAGING BASE
FOR 21st CENTURY STABILIZATION
OPERATIONS
Robert H. Scales, Jr.
Toward the end of 1995, I was privileged to launch and
then participate in, for some 2 and 1/2 years, the Army’s
so-called Army After Next (AAN) Project, which sought to
define the shape and character of landpower beyond the
year 2010 and to investigate two of the principal factors that
cause styles of war to change—technology and geostrategy.
We had some powerful tools to help us hypothesize what
conflict might look like out beyond 2010, including both
tactical and strategic war games and numerous
conferences. AAN war games were conducted at Fort
Leavenworth and Carlisle Barracks, and because of the
complexity were extremely difficult to do. The Army’s great
doctrinal revolution had occurred in the late 1970s and
early 1980s at the operational level, and that was difficult
enough. But now we were attempting to reestablish the
tenets of landpower during warfare at the next higher level.
We conducted a series of exercises using force on force in
free-play scenarios. It is really challenging to replicate
National Training Center exercises in the computer-based
simulations of Collins Hall at the Army War College, but we
did it four times.
Collaterally, in conducting a historical inquiry into the
changing cycles and patterns of war, we observed that war
has mutated from wars of religion to wars of kings to wars of
nations to wars of ideology, and so forth. Increasingly, it
became apparent that the fall of the Soviet empire might
foster a new era of wars characterized by ethnic and cultural
conflict. Accordingly, we postulated a clash in the year 2020
involving a newly emergent hegemonic power in central
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Asia seeking to reestablish ethnic and cultural dominance
over a small country in southeastern Europe. The
hegemonic power aimed to achieve its strategic and
operational objectives quickly—that is, to put forces on the
victim’s ground, disperse them, and then begin a process of
cultural transformation in that country before the United
States could project forces into the region and initiate an
effective response.
We also made a series of visits, an intellectual odyssey if
you will, to representatives of all the major armies around
the world island. For my part, I spent almost 2 years doing
this, enjoying an opportunity to conduct searching discourse
with the leaders of most of the armies in eastern and central
Asia. Based upon impressions gleaned from my visit and
similar visits by other AAN Project team members, we
formulated a general outline of what the nature of conflict
might be out to the year 2025 and beyond. It tended to
confirm our earlier suspicions, based upon historical
investigation, that the most likely causes for conflict during
that period would be ethnic and cultural in nature.
It seemed to us that such conflicts would arise along
those historical borders separating traditionally
antagonistic economic, religious, ethnic, national, or
cultural groupings. The territories of such disputants are
analogous to geological tectonic plates, colliding against and
ultimately riding over or sinking under adjacent plates in
an eternal friction of heat, strife, and violence. Such
collisions have been the occasion of major wars for the last
5,000 years. To borrow Samuel Huntington’s famous fault
line analogy (“The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs,
Summer 1993), it seemed to us that the greatest potential
for serious combat during our time frame would occur along
these traditional fault lines.
History clearly shows that when the artificial caps that
suppress or sublimate ethnic and cultural conflict are
removed, the actors revert to this approach and conflict
resumes. Thus it seemed to us that the maintenance of
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security and stability along these fault lines would depend
on the ability of political structures to manage the
inevitable tensions by means short of war. In any event, we
were certain we knew where tensions were most likely to
flare into outright hostilities. That is why we chose
southeastern Europe as the setting for our first war game. It
happens that this particular region marks the intersection
of not two but three fault lines—Eastern Orthodox
Christianity, Islam, and Western Christianity.
In talking to the potential major actors, it seemed to us
that we were seeing an almost spontaneous process of
change well under way among many of the armies around
the world island. We observed, first of all, a shedding of Cold
War baggage and attitudes. I was struck particularly by
how quickly armies of the world are relinquishing major
weapon systems and readjusting their style of war to a light
force milieu. Even in large mass armies, such as those
around the Asian rim, we saw a process of streamlining and
lightening of the forces. Perhaps surprisingly, another
interesting phenomenon we observed was an attempt by the
officer corps in many of these armies to forego corruption
and doctrinaire ideological stances—thus producing a more
mature, professional, and better-educated officer class.
It was also somewhat of a shock to discover how
knowledgeable of American operational methods many of
these officers are. They also are intensely curious about how
Americans fight. More specifically, they are interested in
our doctrinal focus on the operational art. These armies in
many ways have moved into the era that we faced back in
the early 1970s. Much as we did, they moved from a tactical
focus to one more directed at operational art and
operational maneuver. Strategically, they seem bent on
deflecting the ability of major world powers to interfere with
their own hegemonic ambitions, principally by defeating
incursions from air and sea.
They are also turning their attention to information
technologies, but they come at it from a different vantage
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point than we do. The last trip I made was to China. I had a
chance to talk to my counterpart in that country. Many of
his questions and comments dealt with information
technology, information warfare, and so forth. His take was
quite interesting. He said,
General, the information age is neutral; you have your style of
war that is facilitated by information technology. It gives you
the ability to see with great clarity and to strike with great
speed and precision. But in our style of war, information
technology is also helpful because the Internet and cellular
communications allow us to do what we do best, which is to fight
wars of area control; to capitalize on the endurance of our
people; to exploit time and the inherent power of forces on the
defensive to disperse, to go to ground, to control wide areas of
territory, and still to maintain the ability to mass on demand.1

The only English term he used during our conversation was
“non-nodal Army,” as contained in the following sentence
delivered in Chinese:“ What we seek to build is a non-nodal
army.” He was saying that modern distributive
communications would permit control of massed armies
without the necessity of large, cumbersome, hierarchical
control headquarters.
Thus as the tectonic plates begin to collide in the
post-2010 time frame, they are going to bring with them the
possibility of collisions between different styles of warfare
along these critical lines of contact. It seems to us that the
war in Kosovo may very well have provided a foretaste of
how such warfare might play out in the future.
Beyond the year 2010, though we might not see the rise
of a true peer competitor, we may very well see the
emergence of what was referred to in our AAN study as a
“major competitor,” one that uses its inherent strengths to
counter our inherent weaknesses. In practically every
country I visited, when I asked the question, “What are
America’s military weaknesses?” the answer that came
back was “aversion to casualties and the political need to
end the war quickly.” Therefore, as one officer told me,
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“Time is our friend and time is your enemy.” Another
recalled to me the famous response of Ho Chi Minh in 1964
when a French journalist asked him how he could possibly
expect to beat the world’s most technologically advanced
country: “They will kill many of us, we will kill a few of them,
and they will tire first.”
Major competitors out beyond the year 2010 will not try
to re-create a bipolar world. They won’t try to match the
United States weapon system for weapon system. They will
focus on landpower and the ability to maintain an army in
being. Their object will not be to defeat the United States,
but rather to avoid losing. Meanwhile time will take its toll,
or so the thinking goes, on the American popular will, and
victory will accrue to our competitor by default. Remember
Vietnam?
Now what does all this have to do with America’s future
relation with Europe? To go back to the AAN war games
played in 1997 and 1998, in every one of those war games
the critical element in achieving success was the ability of
American forces to arrive early and position themselves so
as to prevent the enemy from settling in and establishing
control over the areas comprising his operational and
strategic objectives. And regardless of the site of actual
hostilities—in southeastern Europe, in Northeast Asia, or
in the Middle East—Europe remained the critical launch
platform.
Though we assumed initially that we would be able to
project forces from the continental United States early
enough to block the enemy on the ground and thwart his
operational design, we later found that expectation to be
totally unrealistic. Some form of forward stationing,
whether of materiel or forces in being, had to be available at
strategic intermediate staging bases in Europe. The forces
already in Europe were usually the ones that arrived in the
theater of hostilities first and applied the initial preemptive
counterstroke. This action was critical because if the enemy
succeeded in accomplishing his initial objectives, then
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friction became a problem, time turned against us,
casualties began to mount, resolve began to erode, and a
successful outcome became extremely problematic.
It thus seemed to us in the AAN business that Europe
would continue to have a vital role to play in the
maintenance of global security and stability. It sits astride
or near the intersection of three of the most active and
dangerous strategic tectonic plates. Thus, whether as a site
of conflict or solution for conflict, Europe remains critical on
proximity grounds alone. Moreover, it represents a secure
intermediate staging base that proved decisive in all our
war scenarios.
Does that mean that the nature of our forces in Europe
should remain immutable? While our games did not answer
that question specifically, they seemed to suggest that tasks
like humanitarian support, force projection support, C4ISR,
forward intelligence support, and forward logistics basing
are becoming increasingly important. 2 The possession of a
forward logistics base will become particularly essential. It
may therefore be that over the next 15 to 20 years the nature
and character of forces in the region will change to reflect
these growing support priorities. Whatever the precise
nature of the forces in Europe, however, the AAN studies,
exercises, and war games led me to conclude that Europe
will continue to be a critical arena for the maintenance of
global security, and that the United States can most
efficiently and effectively contribute to such security by
retaining appropriate forces in Europe.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5
1. Conversation with PLA senior leaders at the Nanjing Army
Command College, Nanjing, China, August 21, 1998.
2. The acronym C4ISR encompasses command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance.

58

QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, AND COMMENTARY,
CHAPTERS 3, 4 AND 5
Dr. Carpenter. General Naumann made a point about
the warming relations between Russia and China and the
Russian proposal for a triangular alliance among these two
countries and India. It’s important to recognize that this
development is not unrelated to the policies adopted by the
United States and its NATO allies. The factors driving
Russia, China, and India together are such things as the
expansion of NATO’s membership into central Europe and
the prospective expansion even further east. Even more
important are NATO’s military actions in the Balkans.
Many in the West regarded those as morally and
strategically justifiable, but to the Russians, Indians, and
Chinese, those actions were viewed in a very different light.
In some ways this is International Relations Theory 101.
Just as nature abhors a vacuum, the international system
tends to abhor a unipolar system. The world does not want a
global hegemon, even if that would-be hegemon sees itself
as a benevolent hegemon, as the United States does. We
should therefore expect movements towards the creation of
a counter-hegemonic coalition. What we’re seeing are
probably the first stages of that.
General Naumann. I agree completely.
QUESTION. General Naumann, you said, and I think
accurately, that we give Europe very little credit for its
contributions to maintaining stability in Eastern Europe
and in Russia. I confess, however, that I don’t know
specifically what Western Europe or NATO has done in that
regard. Could you clear that up?
General Naumann. NATO’s primary contribution has
been the Partnership for Peace Program. That is a program
to stabilize these fledgling democracies. You should never
forget that though we often speak of these former Warsaw
Pact countries as democracies, right now that’s only
formally true. Democracy is a phenomenon just visible at
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the surface. The system of democracy is not yet deeply
ingrained, and as is often the case in history, it is tied to
economic well-being. Economic well-being and the stability
of democracy have a close interrelationship which I cannot
quantify exactly, but I know it’s there. If we don’t make sure
that these countries prosper economically, there may be a
tendency with the people to recall the old system as being
better. For example, we have many people in Eastern
Germany over the age of 45, the lost generation of the
unification process, who believe the old system was better.
There is a similar element in Russia, Poland, the Czech
Republic, and Hungary. Thus we cannot be sure that
democracy is now ingrained forever. There is a widespread
illusion in the United States that democracy is the
prevailing system in the world. In truth, democracies are
the minority, and may remain so for a long time. Thus we
have to work to make sure that the new countries stay the
course.
Even more important than the Partnership for Peace
Program is what the European Union nations are
contributing economically. Germany, for example, has
subsidized Russia to the tune of approximately 90 billion
German marks. We did not see the result we had hoped for.
The money was presumably one of many drops in the
bucket, but at least we made an effort. Germany made
similar gestures with regard to Poland, the Czech Republic,
and Hungary. Germany invests money in Bulgaria and
Romania, and other European countries do the same. The
European Union will shoulder a tremendous burden during
the membership negotiations with Poland, Hungary, the
Czech Republic, and Estonia. Should the European Union
continue the folly of the common agricultural policy as
presently conceived, we will have to open several Fort
Knox’s to pay the bill. In any case, the effort to integrate
Eastern European countries into the European community
will represent a huge investment in stability. The
Europeans will have to shoulder the bill. This reality is
sometimes not well understood in America.
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Dr. Carpenter raised the question of whether the
American presence in Europe ever redounds to America’s
economic advantage. I was once closely involved in an
important Iranian gas pipeline issue. I can state
categorically that had there not been an American presence,
the attitude of the German government would have been far
different. As it was, however, the German government
supported the position of the United States, an act very
much in America’s interest.
Professor Mearsheimer. It seems to me that the case for a
sustained and sizable American military presence in
Europe has to be based on the argument that we are the
pacifier, to use Josef Joffe’s term, in that region, and that
having a stable Europe is a vital U.S. interest. Therefore, we
should be willing to spend huge amounts of money and put
our troops in harm’s way in Europe, because if we do not,
there will be intense security competition and maybe even
war. But nobody seems to have spelled out what are the
likely sources of trouble in Europe. I would like to know
what is likely to go wrong if the United States pulls its
troops out of Europe? What states are going to act as
troublemakers? Russia? That seems highly unlikely. It is an
economic and military basket case, with little chance that
things will improve much over the next decade, at least to
the point where Russia would be a meaningful threat. The
British and the French? Are they going to cause trouble? Or
is it the Germans who are the likely culprits? Are we going to
have the second coming of the Third Reich? Or will it be the
Second Reich? Are France and Germany going to get
involved in a security confrontation? Almost everyone says
that Germany is not a threat to cause trouble and that there
is no need to fear it because it is a democracy. Of course,
England and France are also democracies. All of this leaves
me wondering which states are going to cause trouble in
Europe? Where is the threat to peace that justifies an
American military presence? If there is no threat to
stability, I say bring the troops home and allow the
Europeans to live in harmony with each other.
61

General Naumann. The idea of having the Americans
there as pacifier in the case of intra-European conflict is
outdated. The reason is that the German question is settled.
The real reason behind World Wars I and II was the issue of
Germany’s orientation, whether to the East or to the West.
This issue is settled once and forever. Germany belongs to
the West. It’s firmly tied to the Western community of
nations. The issue of German revanchism is a dead legacy of
the past. It was a terrible past, and we have all suffered from
it terribly. We Germans, although most culpable in causing
World War II, now know what it means to be divided, and as
families we know what it means for children to grow up
without knowing their fathers. I belong to a family in which
neither my wife nor I ever had a chance to see our fathers
alive since both of them were killed in action in Russia. We
know what it means to the second generation to grow up
without knowing what a grandparent is. It may sound
emotional, but it is an impact that one feels over
generations. Germany learned its lesson, and the
pacification question is no longer an issue. The Germans are
marching nicely in NATO ranks, and there will be no
inclination to get out of that line.
Actually, if there is a problem with Germany, it lies in
the opposite direction. After World War II, you told us to
never use our military muscles again. But when German
unification occurred, you were among the first who told us,
“Hey Germans, stand on the parapet and be six feet tall.”
That doesn’t happen overnight. It is a remarkable
achievement that after a period of only 6 to 7 years Germany
is now prepared to assume its full role and take on the
responsibility to fight a war if necessary, as a reliable NATO
ally. So, to repeat, pacification is not the issue.
The real issue is apart from the power projection issue
which General Scales referred to and which from a strategic
point of view is admittedly important. The predominant
rationale for an ongoing U.S. presence in Europe is the
management of Russian weakness. No European country
can manage the problem of Russia. Without close U.S.
62

involvement, we may end up with serious trouble. This issue
deserves your continued close attention.
It is much better for the United States to be closely
involved in European issues than to be a benevolent but
passive hegemon sitting some 6,000 kilometers away. As
soon as you are back across the Atlantic, yours will be
simply one of the many voices that we hear in our globally
interconnected world. Yours is a powerful voice without any
doubt, but you are some distance away from the center of
gravity. I am not arguing that we Europeans should shirk
from trying to resolve Europe’s own backyard issues. I
desperately hope that the European Union will have the
guts to tackle them. But this will require some time. So at
the end of the day, I would not be opposed to a formula which
under the framework of NATO redefines the relationship
between the United States and Canada on one hand, and
the European Union on the other. But whether, as Dr.
Carpenter seems to suggest, it will be possible for the
United States to enjoy influence without paying the price of
a presence, I have my doubts.
Dr. Carpenter. I was trying to think whether there was
any aspect of John Mearsheimer’s comments with which I
disagreed, and could not come up with one. I’ll simply
comment briefly on General Naumann’s argument that the
U.S. military presence and the American leadership of
NATO are needed to help “manage Russian weakness.”
Such an attempt is going to be a counterproductive strategy.
First of all, it’s really impossible for any outside power or
group of powers to manage Russian weakness. Russia’s fate
is going to be largely decided by what goes on domestically in
Russia. The external inputs may have an effect at the
margin, but no more than that. But from the Russian
viewpoint, a NATO-centered policy on the part of the United
States, coupled with a U.S.-dominated, offensively oriented,
and proactive NATO, an organization no longer committed
simply to the territorial defense of its members, is not going
to promote strong pro-Western, pro-democratic sentiments
in Russia. Quite the contrary. The word that we at the Cato
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Institute get from our contacts in Russia—and we maintain
contacts specifically with the most pro-democratic,
pro-Western, pro-capitalist elements in the Russian
political and economic elite—was well summarized by
former deputy prime minister Anatoly Chubois, who said
that NATO managed to accomplish with its war in the
Balkans what more than 7 decades of communist rule could
not do. That is, NATO created a large reservoir of genuine
anti-American, anti-Western sentiment in Russia. He
added that the nationalist and communist forces were given
“a political present the size of which they could never have
imagined.” We are getting similar comments from other
pro-Western figures in Russia. Therefore, if a U.S.-led
NATO with its new mission of conflict resolution and
nation-building is supposed to help manage Russian
weakness, I think that is a disastrously counterproductive
strategy.
QUESTION. With regard to the fault line concept in
Samuel Huntington’s article, “The Clash of Civilizations,”
there was an implication by Huntington that conflict
between Islam and the two Christian factions was more or
less inevitable. I wonder whether the fact that NATO and
the Western countries have in general intervened in
support of Islamic populations in the Balkans has possibly
mitigated potential Christian-Islamic conflict. Will it
possibly improve our relations with the Islamic world?
Major General Scales. U.S. involvement in that part of
the world shouldn’t be focused necessarily on improving
relations with the larger group—the Islamics. Rather, the
object should be to diminish the propensity for violence
among all three. If American intervention is somehow
perceived as siding with Islam, that is counterproductive.
Not only is it counterproductive in our long-term
relationship with the Muslim world, but it would cause
increased and unnecessary tensions with Russia. The term
“honest broker” best describes the ideal U.S. role. After 50
years of American presence in Europe, the most commonly
accepted opinion of that presence is that it is largely
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altruistic and constructive. The main reason we’re there is
not to support one side or the other but to defuse conflict. To
return to the metaphor of tectonic plates, we seek to manage
the tremors that occur at this intersection of three fault
lines now rather than marching away and waiting for an
earthquake that’s 8.0 on the Richter scale to occur 10 or 15
years down the road.
When the United States removes itself from a theater, it
never goes back unless drawn back by war. With respect to
three of the most critical sectors of the world
island—Europe, the Middle East, and Northeast Asia—it is
hardly a coincidence that there is an American presence in
all three. For 50 years that American presence has been
benign and hugely effective. Before we as a nation pull up
stakes and go back to Fortress America, we have to think
through what the implications of that decision might be, not
just over the next 10 years, but for the next generation. We
Americans have a tough time thinking beyond the
immediate horizon. However, for me as a serving soldier,
our window of concern should extend out at least 20-25
years. At that range, one can visualize any number of
catalysts that might come along to re-inflame tensions
along the critical boundaries we have spoken of. The mere
presence of American forces in those regions has palliated
the level of violence, permitting us to deal with tremors
rather than earthquakes.
QUESTION. If the United States now reverts to the
posture of isolationism characteristic of the 1930s, aren’t
the odds high that conflicts and instabilities around the
world will eventually reach out to engage us in spite of
ourselves? Isn’t it better to remain involved and work to
prevent conflict rather than remain detached only to be
dragged in later when the level of violence is far higher?
Dr. Carpenter. We need to be leery of such clichés as
“Fortress America” and “isolationism.” Certainly I’m not
advocating Fortress America or isolationism or any other
ill-considered extreme. I’m advocating that the United
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States cease its smothering strategy in Europe and, for that
matter, its even more smothering policy in East Asia. I’m
advocating that we encourage the development of multiple
centers of power in the international system, with the EU
taking primary responsibility in Europe backed by the
United States. The operative phrase is backed by the United
States in a cooperative effort to preserve stability and
security in Europe. In East Asia, I’m advocating that Japan
and other regional powers take primary responsibility,
backed by the United States, for ensuring stability and
security. Such a backup role for the United States means
that it would be the balancer of last resort instead of the
intervenor of first resort—or global nanny—which is our
current role. Playing such a role, we sometimes
intentionally discourage initiatives on the part of American
allies, more so in East Asia than in Europe, because such
expressions of individualism threaten our primacy within
those security relationships. Whether the strategy of global
nanny was appropriate for the Cold War period,
particularly the early part of the Cold War, is now a moot
point. It is not an appropriate role, in fact it is an
increasingly dangerous one, for the United States in the
current and prospective strategic setting.
General Naumann. I listened very carefully to what Dr.
Carpenter said about the negative opinions of Russian
intellectuals regarding NATO involvement in the Balkans.
Of course, one can get such impressions in talking to the
institutniks. Remember, however, that these institutniks
have shown remarkable flexibility in changing their
attitudes over the past 15 years. I dare say that we will
never learn what the real view of the Russian people is. The
institutniks and politicians we talk to—the so-called
elites—will always construe Western actions so as to blame
us for their own failures. That is something that the
Russians are extremely good at. Moreover, regardless of
Western policies, whatever Russian leadership emerges
will very likely be more nationalist than the present
leadership is. The only way to satisfy the Russians would be
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to give them equal status with the United States. If you do
that, then you will have “good Russians.” But is paying such
a price in the interests of the United States? It’s definitely
not in the interest of the European allies of the United
States.
Dr. Carpenter. In our conversations with the Russians,
we are hardly talking to the Russian establishment. We’re
talking to people who are deeply critical of the Russian
government and horrified at the communist and nationalist
alternatives. These are people who have pointed out that
the IMF-led strategy and the Western strategy generally of
throwing money at Russia are abject failures. In fact, one of
our contacts in Russia said, with telling irony, “You know,
the IMF ought to eliminate the middle man and simply
transfer the money directly to the offshore bank accounts of
the Russian financial oligarchy, not sending it through
Moscow. That is just a waste of time.”
The Russians are certainly not expecting any more. They
don’t expect that their country is going to be treated as an
equal of the United States. But they do expect a certain
amount of respect. They expect that Russia will be treated
as a major power in the international system, not treated
with contempt, not denied a significant policy voice, for
instance in the Balkans, as though that’s a region in which
Russia has never had any meaningful interests. Whether
through clumsiness or through Russiphobia, we’re
pursuing a policy of humiliating Russia at every
opportunity. That is the effect. Russia has other options.
They don’t have to passively submit to such treatment.
What we’re finding is their cozying up to China, efforts to
create a counter-hegemonic coalition, and arms transfers to
recipients we are loath to see get them.

67

CHAPTER 6
THE ENLARGING ROLE OF NATO
Stephen Larrabee
It seems self-evident that the security structures of the
Cold War might not be appropriate for deterring the types of
challenges that the United States faces in the future. This
proposition has direct relevance to NATO’s missions, both
now and in the future. The security environment in which
NATO finds itself has changed significantly since 1989. The
old security environment was characterized by a clear,
uni-dimensional threat. This threat involved a possible
direct attack on NATO territory. NATO’s forces, therefore,
were structured to deter such an attack. They tended to be
tank-heavy, and they relied largely on conscript forces,
Britain and the United States being the exceptions.
The new security environment is quite different. The
challenges and risks today are far more diverse, far more
ambiguous, and far less predictable. They include ethnic
conflict, they include terrorism, and they include the spread
of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, the
geographic focus of these challenges has changed. There is
no longer, with the possible exception of Turkey, a direct
threat to NATO territory. Most challenges that NATO will
face come from beyond NATO’s territory. But as we’ve seen
in Bosnia and Kosovo, these challenges can still have an
important impact on the security of Alliance members. As a
result, NATO needs to be able to move, to respond to a broad
spectrum of risks and threats. It still needs the residual
capabilities to carry out Article 5 missions, that is, missions
for NATO’s collective defense, but at the same time it needs
the capability to carry out so called non-Article 5 missions.
These are missions of external crisis response and
management similar to those NATO carried out in Bosnia
and Kosovo. The fact is that most challenges and risks that
NATO is likely to face in the future are non-Article 5 threats
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rather than a direct attack on NATO’s territory. They will
much more resemble those in Bosnia and Kosovo than any
attack that was expected during the Cold War. These trends
have implications for NATO’s core structures and missions.
They mean that NATO will increasingly need the capability
to deploy forces beyond its borders, that it will need the
capability to project force and power.
More specifically, in order to deal with these new
challenges NATO will need forces that are more mobile,
flexible, sustainable, and survivable. The forces will need to
be capable of deploying beyond NATO territory, and they
will need to be more interoperable in order to carry out
effective coalition operations. The Defense Capabilities
Initiative, which was approved at the Washington Summit
in April 1999, is designed to address these requirements.
There were calls for improvements in five areas: mobility
and deployability; sustainability and logistics;
survivability; effective engagement; and command, control,
and communications. If these improvements are made,
NATO will be in a better position to address and deter the
new threats it’s likely to face in the coming decade.
The proposition that somehow the United States is
trying to be a global nanny and preserve its primacy in
Europe is simply wrong. On the contrary, what the United
States is trying to do is push its allies to take up more
responsibility for defense not only against threats in
Europe, but against threats that emanate from beyond
Europe. This is precisely what the Defense Capabilities
Initiative is designed to do—not to preserve primacy, but to
get the Europeans to improve their capabilities and to take
more responsibility. There has been considerable criticism
in the United States and especially in some parts of
Congress of the new NATO. The basic complaint is that
since NATO worked well for 50 years, there is no need to
change it. As one senator said, “If it ain’t broke, why fix it?”
However, this view ignores the fundamental changes in the
European security environment that have taken place since
1989. If NATO does not change—and I believe it already
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has—if it does not adapt to meet the new security
challenges, it risks becoming increasingly irrelevant. If
NATO does not address the key security challenges, it will
not be able to retain public support over the next decade. If it
remains configured against a threat that no longer exists, it
simply will not be credible.
But most of the Alliance’s militaries, particularly the
European militaries, are configured to defend borders that
are no longer threatened. Britain and France are
exceptions, while Italy and the Netherlands also are moving
away from this posture. It is not that Europe lacks enough
forces, but that they have the wrong type of forces.
European forces are and remain very manpower-heavy,
while underequipped with modern weapons and
equipment. Countries of the European Union field about 1.9
million men, while the United States, with all its global
responsibilities, has 1.4 million men under arms. Since the
Europeans spend so much on manpower, there is little
money left over for research and development, acquisitions,
operations, and maintenance. For example, Germany, Italy,
and Greece, together fielding 800,000 military personnel,
which is close to 60 percent of the U.S. total, spend only 12
percent of what the United States does on procurement.
One source of the problem is that most European armies,
except for Britain and Luxembourg, rely on conscription.
Conscription produces more manpower than is needed for
the missions that NATO must carry out today, and
particularly tomorrow. Europe therefore will have to move
towards a professional Army. France and Spain have
already made the decision to do this. Pressure on the rest of
the European militaries to do so is likely to increase. But
developing a professional Army entails expenses of its own,
especially in the initial phase, and funding will be difficult
to achieve in an era of declining or flattening defense
budgets.
In this regard, Kosovo has exercised a beneficial effect.
Kosovo was for the Europeans a very sobering experience, a
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wake-up call if you will, galvanizing them to address some of
these deficiencies. It underscored the distinction between
quantitative and qualitative superiority. Some 5 percent of
the aircraft and four-fifths of the ordnance released against
Serb targets were American. The gap was particularly
glaring in precision guided missiles. At the same time, the
Kosovo conflict demonstrated major differences in
performance of individual European allies. France, with
only 9 percent of NATO’s defense spending, generated 12.8
percent of all the strike sorties. There are some signs that
the Europeans are beginning to come to grips with this
problem. There is within Europe now a new emphasis on
capabilities rather than simply institutions. There is also an
emphasis on building a real European security and defense
identity. Whether this impulse will remain simply rhetoric
or not remains to be seen, but nonetheless the emphasis is
there.
ESDI, the European Security and Defense Identity,
could provide the impetus for Europeans to enhance their
capabilities. But it needs to avoid three potential pitfalls:
first, de-coupling the United States from Europe; second,
duplication of effort; and third, discrimination against
NATO members who are not EU members, such as Norway
and Turkey. Some critics in Congress and the United States
military oppose NATO’s new missions. They worry that
these operations reduce the readiness of U.S. forces and
their ability to respond to threats elsewhere. These are
legitimate concerns, but in expressing them, they advocate
a new division of labor in which Europe would take care of
the threats in Europe while the United States looks after
the rest of the world. This view, while superficially
attractive, has several flaws. First of all, over the long term
it would lead to increasing U.S. unilateralism. Second, the
United States does not have the military capability to deter
or address all the non-European conflicts on its own. Third,
and most important, it would weaken the trans-Atlantic
link. Europe would increasingly be left on its own. That is
not a good idea.
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A far better approach would involve a new strategic
bargain, a new partnership with Europe, one that is broader
and at the same time more equal. In this partnership, the
United States would remain engaged in Europe and help
Europe deal with security problems, while Europe at the
same time would take up more responsibilities for Europe.
In return, Europe would share with the United States more
of the burdens and responsibilities for security beyond
Europe’s borders. The United States will need allies to
manage many of the key security problems in the coming
decade. The challenges are simply too large for one power to
manage, even one as powerful as the United States. Europe
will require a partner also, and the United States is its most
likely and desirable partner. Unless Europe begins to
assume more of the responsibility for challenges to common
interests, U.S. support for NATO will decline.
Many of these challenges to common interests are on
Europe’s outermost periphery and even beyond its borders,
such as those in the Persian Gulf. This is not to argue that
NATO as an institution should directly address such
threats. It’s unlikely to get 19 nations to take concerted
action against a threat as distant as the Gulf. Any military
reaction would most likely come from a coalition of the
willing, composed of several key American allies in Europe.
But the NATO force planning process can be used to help
develop the capabilities that would make such a coalition
easier to establish and more militarily effective.
This is not, I want to emphasize, a call for a global
NATO, as some critics have charged. NATO will be able to
act only if there is a general consensus within the Alliance to
do so. This will limit the number of crises in which NATO
will be able to act, particularly those beyond Europe’s
borders. But it is important for the United States and its
allies to take a broader view of their common interests and
the threats to them. As noted earlier, many threats to these
common interests in the future will not be in Europe, but on
Europe’s periphery or beyond. The United States and its
European partners need the military capability to address
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such threats. This requires in the end a broader and at the
same time more balanced and equal partnership. In this
sense, the United States has to move from being a protector
to being a more equal partner with Europe.
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CHAPTER 7
GUIDING NATO’S FUTURE:
A RETURN TO BASICS
Charles Glaser
I shall start from the assumption that major war in
Europe would be a serious problem for the United States.
This proposition is arguable, I suppose, but there seems to
be a sufficient consensus to permit me to accept it and then
move on to its implications.
Since the end of the Cold War, we’ve seen a long list of
possible missions for NATO, ranging widely in purpose. One
of the most important but least discussed is to maintain a
hedge against a resurgent Russia. Another important one is
to preserve confidence, stability, and peace among Europe’s
other major powers in Western Europe. The issue there is
renationalization of militaries and what that would do. This
is also not talked about very much. Preserving peace among
NATO’s other members is a third possibility, Greece and
Turkey most prominently. Then we get to the newer
missions: promoting the establishment of democracy and
free markets throughout Europe; preserving peace among
Europe’s non-NATO members; and combating the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has begun to stress
such new missions, whether they are undertaken by NATO
itself or by a smaller coalition formed among NATO
members. Such declared priorities as maintaining peace
and stability in Europe broadly defined and promoting
democracy and free markets reflect one of the following
subtexts: either Russia is not worth worrying about now and
maybe not in the future, or—and this is actually quite a
common view—Russia is worth worrying about, if not now,
then definitely in the future. However, many analysts
believe this latter rationale will not sell to the public, and
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thus find themselves creating pretext missions for NATO to
save it for the authentic uses they think will not sell on merit
alone.
The clearest examples of this were the early arguments
for NATO expansion. The argument was framed something
like this: we need to expand NATO so that it doesn’t
dissolve; it must expand or die. Such an argument raises the
question of whether the expansion is justified on its own
terms or whether NATO is being preserved for something
else, and if so, what. The same questions apply to
out-of-area missions. But there is mounting concern that
some of these new missions, these humanitarian and
stabilization interventions throughout Europe, may not sell
in the United States because they do not address vital
American interests. They are important American interests
but they are not vital interests. Nonetheless, there has been
a continuing effort to preserve NATO for eventual service in
behalf of America’s truly vital interests by linking NATO
with peripheral causes that, while certainly important, fall
well short of vital.
However, the most compelling reason for keeping the
Alliance remains the need to deal with Russia—not the
Russia of today but the potential Russia down the road, not
a weak Russia but a resurgently powerful Russia, not a
Russia with goals like those of America and Europe but a
Russia whose goals are starkly antithetical to those of the
West. Such a rationale has the best hope of preserving the
Alliance. It hasn’t been sold by American leaders, but my
hunch is that it can be. Far from striving to preserve the
Alliance, the new NATO missions are actually a threat to it.
It’s not that these missions are unjustified on their own
terms. Certainly the recent experience in the Balkans,
where we’ve saved thousands of lives, perhaps tens of
thousands, and alleviated much human suffering, shows
that they are important. But they will over time strain the
Alliance and thus make it more likely that when we need it
for bigger purposes, it won’t be there or it will be too
attenuated to do the job.
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In sum, proponents basically are promoting these new
missions as a way to save the Alliance, implying that we
should perform them even if each individual action isn’t
justified on its own terms, because the efforts in the
aggregate will justify themselves by preserving NATO. I
would argue the reverse. They may be worth doing on their
own terms, and they’re certainly very valuable from a
humanitarian angle, but we should recognize that they
actually threaten the Alliance and view the trade-off with
our eyes wide open. I would argue for narrowing our view of
NATO’s purpose, not banning it from taking on these other
missions, not precluding them as an option, but viewing the
Alliance differently, in terms of fundamental U.S. interests.
Such interests lie in deterring or winning a major power
war. Superficially, one might conclude that I’m stuck in a
Cold War frame of mine. But it’s not a Cold War frame of
mind. It’s a geopolitical or power-oriented frame of mind,
bent on connecting U.S. vital interests with threats to those
interests. Many actions possibly worth taking are not
related to those interests. We need to be quite clear when
such is the case so that we can properly evaluate the
inevitable trade-offs involved in expending resources on
interests that, while worthwhile, are not vital.
Why is hedging against a future Russian threat still the
strongest argument for keeping NATO? Recalling the list of
possible missions for NATO that I discussed earlier, there
are only two that deal with vital U.S. interests in a
European context: addressing the danger from Russia and
preventing conflict among Western powers themselves.
Let’s look at those.
It is both difficult and dangerous to dismiss the
possibility of a future threat from Russia. Yes, one can do so
if he puts aside Russia’s nuclear weapons. The country is
weak, possibly disintegrating, disorganized, and struggling
with a variety of political and economic transformations
which it may not accomplish. However there’s a reasonable
bet, not a certain bet, maybe less than fifty-fifty, that in the
next century Russia will become a strong power again. It’s a
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very large country, a rich country, with tremendous human
capital. If it puts institutions into place that work, it can be a
powerful country again, not in 10 years the way things are
going, but perhaps in 20 or 30. In the long march of history,
the burden of maintaining a strong NATO for another 20-30
years as a hedge against a resurgent, nuclear-armed Russia
is certainly not excessive.
Russia remains a major nuclear power and will for the
foreseeable future unless it collapses in a truly fundamental
way. This is not impossible, but it’s not a comforting thought
either, since a radical collapse of the Russian government
would unleash threats to our security that, while different
in nature, would be no less dangerous. Russia is not a threat
to western Europe or central Europe today, but there are
some potential leaders of Russia who could pose a threat,
who could have goals that ultimately threaten the Europe
lying west of Russian borders. U.S. concern over future
dangerous aggression from Russia is appropriate if one
accepts that major war in Europe would threaten vital U.S.
interests.
With regard to stability within western Europe itself, I
tend to be more confident than pessimistic. Renationalization of European forces probably would not lead to
conflict. But it is possible that we might end up with a
nuclear Germany. I don’t think Europe could handle that as
well. But such an eventuality could perhaps be made more
acceptable and manageable if it occurred in the context of a
more unified European force. That’s another possibility. In
any event, I don’t see major conflict coming out of western
Europe whether the United States stays or leaves. If the
United States stays and we preserve NATO the way it is, it
eliminates any concerns of German nuclearization. I don’t
look on this as a major benefit because the likelihood of such
a move on Germany’s part is so small, but the reassurance is
on the plus side.
The other American interests associated with U.S.
continuance in NATO are, with all due respect, secondary
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interests or even tertiary interests. We have traditionally
defined American interests in terms of threats to the United
States, its territory, its people, and its sustaining economic
interests. Humanitarian conflicts don’t pose threats to such
U.S. interests. The markets in Europe that we’re interested
in will not be undermined, though they may be strained, by
some of the collateral impacts of those conflicts. But they’re
not vital in the sense that we invest tens of billions of dollars
a year in the areas affected and are willing to sacrifice large
numbers of American lives to pacify them. Of course, such
actions may be worth taking anyway. That’s an issue on
which we need informed debate in this country.
However, to develop a point I broached earlier,
continuing to pursue such secondary missions and, more
importantly, identifying NATO with those missions will
strain and possibly endanger the Alliance. That is a risky
course because we require a viable NATO while we wait out
the transformation in Russia, and, to some extent, while we
wait out the creation of a unified defense and security policy
in Europe. To put attainment of these goals at risk
represents potentially large costs of pursing secondary
missions, although having to pay such costs may have low
probability.
Let’s now look more closely at why pursuit of secondary
missions is going to strain the Alliance. These secondary
missions are aimed at providing stability and security in
Europe outside of the NATO membership, including the
Balkans. They may even entail admission of new members
beyond the current ones and extending to them Article 5
protections. This latter idea is, of course, part and parcel of
the current NATO expansion debate. There is substantial
disagreement within NATO about going beyond the present
geographical confines of the NATO countries. Thus there is
likely to be strong support for maintaining the mission
oriented on Russia, but far less support for the new
missions.
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The man in the street understands this—I don’t know
why it escapes the understanding of the elites. I ask my
relatives and friends who are not in the security affairs
business, “Are you confident that Russia, now that it’s weak,
is not going to be a problem for us down the road?” They say,
“No, I’m not confident at all.” They understand the
situation. Fallen states have risen. Weak states have
become strong states. States have recovered from worse
misfortunes and become major powers. Russia will do the
same. People understand that major war in Europe,
particularly nuclear war, would be a threat to the United
States. They realize that Russia is a nuclear power, and it’s
going to face other nuclear powers in Europe. Ask them,
“Are you willing to maintain NATO if it doesn’t cost too
much to hedge against such a threat even though right now
you don’t need to build forces directed against that threat?” I
believe the answer will be yes. It depends on keeping the
costs within bounds. The costs of NATO are dropping, and
they are not inordinate. The forces are smaller. They can get
somewhat smaller if necessary. The Quadrennial Defense
Review barely mentions force requirements for Europe. The
force drivers are outside of Europe.
Public sentiment on the new missions, however, is up for
grabs. It may be that there will be broad support within the
United States and NATO for doing these things. They are
obviously honorable and important missions. But there is
tremendous aversion to casualties, to the use of ground
troops. There was no guarantee the war in Kosovo would be
a success. According to the commentaries written during
the war about the impact of a failure in Kosovo on NATO,
there was great concern that the air campaign would fail
and that the Alliance would be hurt. Failure would have
undercut the way NATO was defining itself in terms of new
missions. Though we have been successful in Kosovo thus
far, no one can foresee what the ultimate result will be, nor
can one foresee whether similar undertakings in the future
will be able to avoid failures that rend the Alliance.
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The path of wisdom demands rather that NATO revert to
its primal role—to protect Europe from major power war.
Arrangements could be flexible enough to permit ad hoc
secondary missions when circumstances demanded it and
public resolve was strong, but such missions would be
exceptional as a matter of policy. If NATO chose to demur
regarding any proposed interventions, it would not be seen
as a defeat for the Alliance since there would be no
declaratory policy generating pro forma expectations of
out-of-area involvements. In the near term, NATO might
still want to configure its forces for secondary operations
because, while waiting to see what happens in Russia,
intervention forces will be the only kind it will need. NATO
will need forces that can be deployed out of its area, but it
won’t define itself fundamentally in terms of such a role. It
will define itself in terms of patient vigilance, helping avoid
what’s most dangerous over the horizon. There is no
inconsistency in such a stance.
How should one characterize such a policy? Here,
rhetoric is important. Policymakers could say candidly that
the policy is a hedge, but this formulation is impolitic, given
our efforts to promote cooperation with Russia. Some have
suggested a less pointed term like “strategic reassurance” or
“reassurance against great power war,” and this is probably
wisest. The rhetoric and terms need to be worked out over
time. Whatever their precise formulation, they will need to
reassure Western Europe about threats from within and
without, and they will need to reassure Russia that NATO is
not ganging up on it or denying it its rightful place on the
international stage.
If we believe that a future Russia is something we need
to worry about, and thus need to be planning for, then we
must bear in mind several corollary factors. We need to have
an alliance in place against the time when Russia is strong
and dangerous. In the interim, we need to avoid pursuing a
set of policies that make such a Russia more likely. Rather,
we must pursue policies that help with the transformation
of Russia in the desired directions. Some of these policies are
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specifically American, some specifically NATO. For
example, NATO should be wary of taking on new members
at present, particularly the Baltic countries. It would be
wiser to wait until those countries actually begin to face a
threat and then deciding. To extend North Atlantic Treaty
Article 5 protection to them now when they don’t need it
could be self-defeating. On the American side, we should be
somewhat more willing to make compromises with Russia
on nuclear policy. National missile defense is a prime
example. Surely it is not smart for us to initiate a national
missile defense system that may not be technically feasible
and workable but which is still quite unacceptable from
Russia’s perspective.
Economic assistance is another area where the United
States must take a farsighted approach. Such assistance
may be far more symbolic than practical, but it’s important
that we not try to keep Russia down and that Russia not
perceive us as trying to keep it down, even though it will be
aware of our concern over a possible aggressive turn by
Russia in the future. Our approach should be to help Russia
become strong, even as we encourage to the extent possible
its creation of free and democratic institutions and its
establishment of firm political, economic, and security ties
with the western family of nations.
In sum, I am suggesting a risk-averse approach for
NATO. Though some may see this approach as too
risk-averse, it has the virtue of going back to basics. It
returns to the view that NATO is fundamentally a military
alliance and that the American stake in remaining a
member is to protect its manifest vital interests. Such a
posture does not preclude taking on new missions, which
may become increasingly important and pressing in the
next decade, but it keeps the priorities clear, always
distinguishing vital interests from the merely important.
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CHAPTER 8
AN ADDITIONAL ROLE FOR NATO:
PROMOTING COLLECTIVE SECURITY
ELSEWHERE
Carl Kaysen
Sentiment today appears divided as to whether NATO’s
original prime mission—mutual defense in a bipolar world
under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty—is still
important. In any event, most seem to agree that within the
next 10 years it’s hardly likely to be relevant. I would argue,
however, that 20 years is a better estimate of the time span
in which Article 5 is unlikely to be relevant. Therefore I do
not think it can be successfully maintained, even in a
reassurance or contingent mode, as the central mission for
NATO now.
The American government, in urging NATO expansion
and leading the way to that result, argued for an extension
of the zone of peace, stability, democracy, and market
economies all tied together in Europe as the central new
mission of NATO. I take an extremely dim view of that goal.
In expanding NATO, we have already created negative
effects on the security prospects of Europe that far outweigh
whatever gains we have made. I recognize the powerfully
earnest desire of the Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians to be in
NATO, and I’m sure that other would-be NATO members
share those desires, but such desires rest on a poor
calculation of their interests. There are more effective
interest-serving instruments with which present and
aspiring NATO members can pursue the admirable goals of
extending the zone of peace, stability, democracy, and
market economies in Europe.
The European Union (EU) and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are much more
suitable entities. The OSCE, now comprised of some 54
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states, sets standards in such areas as military security,
economic and environmental cooperation, human rights,
and humanitarian activities. Also, it undertakes a variety of
preventive diplomatic initiatives designed to deter,
manage, or resolve conflict touching participant states. We
have certainly struck OSCE and NATO’s own Partnership
for Peace (PfP) program a heavy blow by NATO expansion.
It remains to be seen whether it’s a mortal wound. The
wound probably need not be mortal if we don’t press on it
further.
For a variety of reasons, the world’s nation-state system
based on the Westphalian model of 1648 is no longer even an
approximately good description of the globe’s political
organization. The most important reason is the degree and
quantity of economic interconnections among nations. It’s
not only that we now have massive international flows of
capital, it’s not only the international dispersion of jobs, it’s
the fact that we have evolved a set of norms, many of them
embodied in institutions, some of them embodied in
intertwining legal codes, that govern not only economic
behavior but are serving a normative role in other interstate
activities. If one looks closely at the everyday economic life
of the EU states, he will be hard-pressed to describe them as
self-sufficient sovereigns relying on the principle of
self-help in an anarchic world. They are entangled in a thick
web of normative and institutional constraints that tell
them what they should and what they shouldn’t do, what’s
legitimate to think of doing and what’s not legitimate to
think.
Another factor impelling us to look beyond the
nation-state system is the growing ambiguity of civil
conflict, ethnic and religious violence, interstate terrorism,
and international crime, all of which tend to spill over
borders in one fashion or another and touch us all. Such
threats to peace, order, and stability are not confined to
Europe or any single region. They are world-wide problems,
and they are increasingly demanding international
attention, involvement, and solutions.
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The final factor leading to the irrelevance of the
Westphalian system is that most governments in the world
today have taken on a decidedly populist cast. Admittedly,
the democracies of central Europe are not deep-rooted.
Russia, for example, has not yet had a complete election
cycle which resulted in an enduring peaceful transfer of
power within the executive and legislative branches, and it
remains to be seen whether the Vladimir Putin presidency
can pull this rabbit out of the hat. Thus an exacting test of
formal democracy there has not yet been met. But we can
say that with very few exceptions, such as North Korea and
Iraq, the primary theme of today’s national governments is
in some sense pleasing the public. That characterization
applied even to the communist government in the USSR
after Stalin. The premiership of Nikita Khrushchev was,
despite his note of contempt in applying the phrase “a
government of goulash communism” to it, basically satisfied
the people. This was so despite the fact that it provided too
little goulash for Soviet dinner tables and bought too many
missiles for the Soviet army.
Governments that please the people are influenced by
the people. Such governments may not be democratic; the
popular influence may be distorted; it may be partly
repressed; it may be provided with few channels for formal
expression—but it’s there. The populist impulse is
magnified by other elements now manifesting themselves
on a world-wide scale: the simultaneous sharing of news
information and a large degree of shared culture. Moreover,
we have a set of entrepreneurs of popular sentiment, the
non-governmental organizations, that make it their
business to organize such sentiment, canalize it, and thus
influence governments, which they do with varying degrees
of success on various issues. As a result, the bounds of
sovereignty, that is, the actions which sovereign
governments may legitimately take in relation to the areas
and populations over which they are nominally sovereign,
are increasingly constrained by a steady growth of a widely
shared public view of what is right and just.
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A corollary of the growing irrelevance of the nation-state
is the concurrent growing relevance of supranational forms
of political organization, of which, as noted earlier, the EU
and OSCE are promising examples. We should do all we can
to strengthen and broaden such entities where appropriate
and particularly to avoid actions that tend to undermine
them like the counterproductive expansion of NATO. With
further regard to perceptions of the evolving status of the
nation-state, we may note that states where the rule of law
is absent, where security of the person and basic human
rights are routinely denied, are falling more and more under
a cloud of universal opprobrium. The time may not be too
distant when such states risk being formally denied the
imprimatur of legitimate sovereignty by the international
community. Humanitarian interventions in retrograde
states, which are becoming the sanctioned norm when
human suffering and deprivation are intolerable, might
become the occasion for externally imposed political reform.
What, then, is the task of NATO over the next 10 years?
Clearly it will have to be prepared to take on important
missions on the periphery such as humanitarian and
peacekeeping operations. Beyond these, however, we
should note that NATO has a very significant asset, and of
that asset it holds a monopoly. Specifically, NATO has
learned how to raise, train, and operate a multinational
military force with efficiency and unity of command. Such
an alliance capability is something the world needs more of.
If one thinks of what a more comprehensive security
architecture might be 10 or 20 years from now, it would
emphasize what we see very faint beginnings of in Latin
America (Organization of American States), even fainter
and less coherent beginnings in Africa (Organization of
African Unity), and possibly an organization of some
promise in Europe (OCSE). If these or similar germs are to
grow into instruments holding genuine promise for regional
security, they will require some kind of effective
multinational force. Such a force will need to be organized,
equipped, rapidly deployable, disciplined, and, above
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all—legitimate. A big question is whether such a multinational force—dedicated to humanitarian intervention,
conflict suppression, and conflict prevention missions—is
possible. Experience to date says, “Maybe.”
One of the things we could do to make such an outcome
more possible is to use NATO, not only as a model but as
trainer and mentor. NATO could be employed to teach other
militaries how to organize and equip for alliance warfare
and how to execute humanitarian and peace missions.
During the Cold War, U.S. forces placed great emphasis on
military-to-military contacts with allied and friendly
armies throughout the world, forging bonds of friendship
and mutual trust that redounded to the benefit of security
for all parties. Perhaps we can do this again on a larger scale
and in the context of NATO assistance to regional security
alliances lying beyond NATO’s own territorial preserve.
QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, AND COMMENTARY,
CHAPTERS 6, 7, AND 8
QUESTION. Let’s grant that Russia is NATO’s primary
problem. But what do you do when you have problems like
Bosnia and Kosovo that continue to fester, creating
instability and producing such outrages as genocide?
Professor Glaser. I didn’t mean to preclude those for
NATO missions. What I meant to say was that NATO or a
sufficient group within NATO should have the option of
dealing with those cases. However, we need to shift the
balance of how we describe and think about the purpose of
the Alliance. Our posture should be that the most
legitimate, important, and long-term purpose of NATO lies
to the east, although it may not be the most immediate
problem facing the Alliance. NATO then has the option,
confronted by another Kosovo-like crisis, of declining to take
up the challenge for any one of a number of good reasons.
For example, future governments in NATO may view the
situation differently. They should have the option simply of
expressing regret but refusing to get involved. We should
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not now either by precedent or declaratory policy lock NATO
into an indefinite commitment to undertake secondary
missions. Even today, there are many humanitarian
problems that NATO refuses to take on. I’m not precluding
them, but rather merely urging a clear-eyed examination of
where they stand on our scale of important interests.
Dr. Larrabee. The central purpose of an alliance cannot
be to address a threat which at the moment and for the
foreseeable future doesn’t exist. The real problem today
with Russia is not hedging against its power, but rather
managing its weakness. The difficulty thus is not the
danger of a nuclear attack, although one can’t completely
ignore that. The more likely difficulty would be the result of
loose nukes, and that is where we need to turn our attention.
We need not magnify some threat. We need not curry public
support for a threat that doesn’t exist. That would be wrong.
It would make the development of a partnership with
Russia, however difficult and problematic, virtually
impossible. I would rather focus on the actual problem at
hand, which is to try to develop a partnership with Russia.
Even so, it is important to stipulate that NATO has not
abandoned deterring a residual threat from Russia. The
strategic concept in every NATO statement always talks
about the continued importance of Article 5 and collective
defenses as the core mission. But we must decide where to
put our emphasis in the near term.
QUESTION. We are likely to see an even more explosive
growth of world trade and the opening up of new markets in
the first half of the 21st century than experienced in the
second half of the 20th century. What is the best strategy for
NATO to follow to promote world economic growth and
stability in the first 50 years of the new century?
Professor Kaysen. The prospects for economic growth are
good, but uncertain. They are highly contingent on political
stability, and NATO does play a role in that. Europe will
remain important to the United States, and the
U.S.-European partnership will play a large role in
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promoting economic health throughout the world. Even so,
we will find our security more in the spread of shared norms
of what’s right than through other avenues.
Professor Mearsheimer. Implicit in your question and in
Professor Kaysen’s answer is the belief that increasing
economic interdependence promotes peace. In other words,
as states get richer and become more interconnected, there
is a substantial decrease in the likelihood of war between
them. There is a large international relations literature on
this subject and it finds little support for that claim. Before
World War I, for example, there was a significant amount of
economic interdependence and prosperity in Europe, but
war still happened. More recently, Saddam Hussein
invaded Kuwait in August 1990 in good part because
Kuwait was over-producing its OPEC oil quotas and driving
down world oil prices, thus harming the Iraqi economy,
which was already in serious trouble from its war against
Iran between 1980 and 1988. In short, because of the
interdependency of Iraq and Kuwait through their
membership in OPEC, Iraq chose to attack its neighbor.
Thus, we should at least have reservations about the claim
that economic interdependence produces peace.
Professor Kaysen. The interdependence in existence
before World War I was qualitatively very different from
that prevailing today. It did not have the kind of
institutional support that we have nor did the
interdependence occur under the aegis of a benevolent
hegemon like the United States of today.
QUESTION. With regard to the out-of-area crises that
NATO might address, what would be the limitations?
Would we go as far south as Sudan, as far east as Pakistan?
Would we address crises other than humanitarian?
Dr. Larrabee. The threats that NATO faces are not
confined to Europe. The types of threats to the common
interest extend beyond Europe’s borders. The fact of the
matter is, however, that in order for NATO to take action,
it’s going to need a consensus among 19 countries. Those 19
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countries are most likely going to agree to take action only in
those crises where they feel their interests are truly at
stake. Most such instances are going to be in and around
Europe. The term “around Europe” is very ambiguous, and
that’s because there is no real consensus in NATO as to
exactly how far Europe extends. For example, does it extend
out into the Mediterranean? The distance and type of
missions would depend on the consensus in NATO itself. By
and large, that consensus will remain very Europe-oriented.
QUESTION. If NATO focuses primarily on the long-range
mission of monitoring and deterring a resurgent Russia,
while focussing secondarily on near- and mid-term
interventionist missions, won’t it create confusion
regarding core structure, budget, and training for its
tactical forces?
Professor Glaser. NATO would basically be in the
position of being there in case problems arise someday with
Russia. In the interim, it would have to plan and prepare for
more likely missions. NATO would be there as a diplomatic
statement of U.S. commitment to Europe, in the face of
something that may or may not happen. As Russia changed
over time and if the threat changed, then NATO would
evolve quite dramatically in terms of size and types of forces
to meet the threat. Of course, skeptics might ask, “Isn’t it
odd that NATO is buying forces for its secondary purposes
and not for its first purpose?” That question would have to
be answered, but there is no fundamental contradiction.
Thus I’m not proposing that we prepare for a Russian
threat now. But when we look at core interests on down the
road, we need to be sensitive to Russian potential. If you
believe that once the Americans leave Europe, it will be very
hard ever to get them back and reconstitute a strong
multinational alliance, then there’s a logic to waiting. That
is a bit of a hard sell. Am I confident that we can maintain
NATO by that argument? No. Am I more confident that we
can maintain it by that argument than by attempting to
justify it through new missions? Yes. Thus we have good
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news and bad news. The good news is that the Cold War has
been over for 10 years, and the predominant threat is gone
for the foreseeable future. The bad news is that we must
puzzle through what type of alliance we want to keep, and
this involves us in a more complicated argument. Yes,
security has become more complicated, but the world is not
necessarily more dangerous. If it is more dangerous, I’m not
sure that NATO is well prepared to handle all the dangers.
But there are a couple that it may be prepared to handle,
and those are the ones I’ve talked about.
Professor Kaysen. To obtain continued funding for a
strong NATO against the possibility of a resurgent Russia
some 10 years hence will be an impossible sell. If NATO
doesn’t have serious missions, it can’t be supported. It’s an
illusion to think that we can get support for NATO,
especially in Europe, for an organization that doesn’t
address the key security concerns in Europe itself today.
That is like telling your neighbor, whose house is on fire,
that the more serious threat from fire is the decrepit
mansion down the street and that we should send the fire
engines there, while letting the neighbor’s house continue to
burn.
QUESTION. For those who do want NATO to survive,
wouldn’t it be more logical to redefine its essence,
proclaiming as its new primary mission humanitarian and
peace missions, which are, after all, what NATO is actually
carrying out these days? Why would such missions shatter
the Alliance in the long term?
Professor Glaser. It’s a judgment call. My sense is that
there’s tremendous ambivalence in the United States over
paying high costs for humanitarian interventions, despite
the worthiness of the cause. It may be that I’m wrong and
that, in fact, the American people would commit themselves
to a full range of interventions in Europe. If they are, then in
the short term that’s going to be a better way to sell the
Alliance. Both Bosnia and Kosovo have turned out
reasonably well. It wasn’t guaranteed that they would,
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particularly Bosnia, where our intervention during the
early rough going did strain the Alliance. It depends on how
well you think you can sell this argument. I’m open to the
fact that both rationales—remaining primed for a resurgent
Russia 10-plus years hence, or refocusing on secondary
missions today—are going to be hard sells over time. Until
we’ve obtained contravening data, the latter rationale
might be easier to sell. But if we were sure that Russia is
going to be either benign or weak, and if we were sure that
there will be no problem between western powers, then it
would raise the question whether the United States should
stay in Europe at all. Such a question would touch off a very
important national debate, leading to discussion of how the
resources saved should be spent.
QUESTION. In the post-Kosovo environment, what are the
prospects and advisability of further NATO expansion?
Dr. Larrabee. First, let me comment on Kosovo itself.
The real problem is not NATO being involved in Kosovo. The
real problem is that 75 percent of the missions were carried
out by Americans. Americans are entitled to ask why they
should have to carry the lion’s share of such a campaign.
NATO has been trying to redress that balance and get the
Europeans in better shape to carry out these missions so the
United States won’t have to. If there were a re-balancing
and if the Europeans enhanced their capabilities, there
would not be so much of a problem with U.S. support. As to
the question of NATO enlargement, there will be increasing
pressures in the wake of Kosovo to enlarge the Alliance, in
part because the countries of southeastern Europe went out
on a limb in many cases, providing transit routes, facilities,
and so forth. There’s a feeling in the region at the moment,
for example in Bulgaria and Romania, that since they did go
out on a limb to support NATO, it is now pay-back time.
At the same time, I think that such a rationale for
expansion is wrong. Our difficulties in Kosovo underline the
importance of having members that are in fact contributors
to security, not consumers of it. A problem with the region is
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that most of the candidates for NATO membership are very
much consumers of security and would not make major
contributions to the Alliance. Therefore, NATO will require
a gradualist approach which continues to keep the door
open while undertaking to enhance its candidates’
capabilities to be useful and contributing members. In the
wake of Kosovo, the answer is not to open up a floodgate for
new members. This would undermine NATO’s capacity to
carry out many of the new missions it’s going to have, rather
than increasing stability in southeastern Europe.
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CHAPTER 9
UPDATING NATO FORCES
FOR THE 21st CENTURY
Thomas G. McInerney
NATO forces have been drawn down substantially since
the end of the Cold War in 1989, but the Alliance’s military
command, control, and staffing apparatus remains intact,
fully prepared to direct NATO forces in any future missions
decided upon by competent political authority. My purpose
in this chapter is to discuss the type of forces the United
States will need to deploy in order to meet its commitments
in Europe, with particular emphasis upon air forces.
The United States maintains about 2.3 wings on NATO
territory today pledged to the Alliance. They’re not actually
chopped to NATO control until certain conditions are met
but they plan and train for operational commitment under
the aegis of NATO protocols. In addition to the 2.3 wings, we
train and exercise a continuous stream of Guard and
Reserve forces in Europe. It is vital to prepare such
augmentees, who will arrive in time of war.
The aircraft are designed for close air support, air
interdiction, air defense, in-flight refueling, long-range
transport, and maritime support. Those are the missions
performed today and that will be required in the future. It’s
been easier for the Air Force to transition to a post-Cold War
force than the Army. We’ve only had to make some changes
in our support and the way we fund our support activities to
give our forces mobility. We now have a much smaller
assemblage of air forces compared to the 14 wings present at
the height of the Cold War.
We do a great deal of training in Europe. Training in the
Balkan air space while operating out of Aviano, Italy, was
vital. There was no way, even in a peacetime exercise, that
we could squeeze in the number of aircraft employed in
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Kosovo and not risk airplanes. That’s an inescapable
problem when you are using that kind of mass and
operating in those weather conditions. Hard and realistic
training was what enabled aerial units to accomplish what
they did in Kosovo. The force structure in Europe
today—some 32,000-33,000 personnel and 230 attack,
tanker, transport, and fighter aircraft, with a healthy mix of
precision weapons—seems about right for the foreseeable
future.
During the 11 weeks of Operation ALLIED FORCE, the
7,000 attack sorties represented the highest use of precision
weapons in our history. Fortunately, Mr. Milosevic was the
recipient of that ordnance, and any future adversary who
commits a similar outrage can expect to see such NATO
forces coming after him. The Air Force will be investing in
these areas, particularly in weapons like the Joint Direct
Attack Munition (JDAM), a satellite-guided all-weather
bomb used with the B-2. The B-2 can carry 16 JDAMs today,
and we’re now in the process of modifying the airframe so it
can drop 78 in one pass. The bomb will hit within several
yards of its target. We don’t call it precision, we call it
near-precision. A 2,000-pound bomb going off that close is as
precise as it needs to be. With a price tag of less than $14,000
(the laser-guided versions originally cost $150-200
thousand per bomb), this new version is far more affordable.
Clearly, it should be made available to our NATO allies. It’s
very important that they train and invest in this aspect of
air operations.
Prior to and during Operation ALLIED FORCE, we
brought in some 700 aircraft to augment the 230 already
present in Europe. As mentioned earlier, we don’t need a
force structure of over 900 aircraft in Europe. We require
about 2-plus wings, and the scope to train, exercise, and
move our people in and out. The importance of getting prior
domain experience for air crews in the area where they are
going to operate simply cannot be emphasized enough.
International air traffic conditions and procedures, not to
mention weather and geography, are more difficult in
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Europe than in the United States. Our forces must be
trained to operate where they are likely to fight.
For future Alliance operations, one area in which we
need improvement is that of command, control,
communications, intelligence, and surveillance—
specifically, disseminating in near real time the requisite
information to air crews so that we can re-task airplanes
quickly when the necessity arises. In this information age,
we ought to be doing better. Frankly, if I had to give us a
grade, I’d probably give us a D. It is a pressing problem for
the future force and for the Alliance. We must develop a
seamless system, one in which all air crews automatically
receive the timely informational wherewithal to operate
with optimal effort.
So far as drones—unpiloted aerial vehicles—are
concerned, we are doing some things we never believed we
could do. Initially, we were using them only for surveillance.
We have now progressed to the point, however, where
drones can target a tank under a tree. We will need to
capitalize on such capabilities in our future force structure.
We will need to be able to deploy the machines and have the
proper command, control, communications, intelligence,
and surveillance to fully exploit their potential. It is very
important that all Allied members receive the drone
technology and that they be able to execute electronic
warfare. All will need a force structure that will be
successful in a Balkan-type environment and can survive
against surface-to-air missiles and an integrated air
defense system.
Stealth is very important, and the Air Force puts a lot of
effort into it. The B-2 became the star platform because the
weather degraded the capabilities of other aircraft. Two
B-2s dropping 16 bombs each, thus hitting 32 targets with
great accuracy, provided a very powerful return. That
capability must be part of the future force structure made
available to NATO.

97

Not all aircraft will be Stealth, obviously. We are
anticipating a joint strike fighter, which will be Stealth, but
such a fighter in significant numbers is 10-15 years out.
Thus we’re going to have to do with the current aircraft,
which is disturbing. The average age of all the aircraft in
Kosovo was 26 years. Europe as well as the United States
has a major modernization problem in front of it. Europe
also needs to be thinking in terms of procuring airlift and
tankers so they’ll have mobility. All these concerns are
important.
We also need to keep in mind the Sixth Fleet, which
performs the essential role of protecting NATO’s flanks.
Domain experience is vital as well for naval forces. It may
not be necessary to have a carrier in the Mediterranean all
the time, but carriers do need to be present 4 to 6 months a
year if only for training the naval forces how to operate
there.
How do we pay for all this? Today, 70 percent of the $266
billion slated for defense goes into what we call tail, that is,
support infrastructure, overhead, headquarters, etc. Only
30 percent goes to the warfighter. We do too many things in
the military that are not core business. We need to
outsource and privatize peripheral endeavors, we need to
close about 35 more bases, and we need to have more
acquisition reform to eliminate costs that don’t add value.
That will provide money for high-value items like JDAM
and for the warfighter.
We are working this military too hard. We have been on a
procurement holiday. Army trucks are 40 years old. The
average age of Air Force airplanes is over 20 years. It’s the
oldest it has ever been in our history. We’re depreciating the
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines at the rate of $118
billion a year. In 1998 we put in only $44 billion for
procurement. That’s the procurement holiday. It’s an aging
force. The next administration has got to address that
problem. It’s going to have to shift dollars to the warfighter.
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I do not see a large influx of dollars coming in. To
modernize the force and meet our present commitments, we
need an additional sum of about $300 billion a year. The
President has slated only $112 billion per year over a 6-year
period. The Joint Chiefs have asked for $148 billion per year
over a 6-year period. But we need $300 billion per year to fix
the problem if we want to fix it the way we used to do. But we
should not fix it that way. We should fix it the way U.S.
industry was fixed—by reengineering and reforming. For
example, there are 40,000 people in the Department of
Defense today who are in the finance and accounting
business. None of them pull a trigger. A private sector
organization would probably have 8,000. We need to shift
the dollars spent on those other 32,000 people to the
warfighting side. With such truly fundamental reform, we
could modernize at considerably less than $300 billion a
year additional.
Thus, merely by using the model of U.S. industry we
could pay for modernization. It’s not a complex or high-risk
model. It’s been proven. It would give us the force structure
we need for the next 10 years, one enabling us to stay in
NATO with the presence necessary for providing continued
stability. NATO has done its job magnificently for the last
50 years. If we make the necessary effort now to modernize
its forces, the Alliance can continue to be a successful
presence for peace and security well into the 21st century.
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CHAPTER 10
MODERNIZATION, RESTRUCTURING,
ADAPTATION:
IMPERATIVES FOR NATO FORCES
Jay Garner
In discussing the future military force requirements in
Europe, we find ourselves in a fundamentally different
security environment than that faced prior to 1989. But we
find that essentially our force structure hasn’t changed
much since the early post-Cold War drawdown was
completed. In the future, one enduring feature of the
Alliance is likely to be that the United States will maintain a
trans-Atlantic commitment to NATO. But the key to that
would be whether the United States can achieve a balance
between its peacekeeping role in NATO and elsewhere, on
one hand, and its more central task of fighting and winning
the nations wars wherever they occur, on the other. The
United States must successfully adapt itself now for these
varied roles that lie ahead. In the future a premium will be
placed on full-spectrum capabilities. However, the objective
of military operations—and it will not change—is to impose
our will and restore the peace. The question thus is how do
we redesign our forces to achieve this objective.
How much have the forces in Europe changed? Not
much. We’ve reduced quite a bit. We’re smaller, we’re more
modern, but we haven’t changed much in character. Our set
of capabilities, especially in our Army forces in Europe, is
essentially unchanged. The Army’s four heavy brigades
have no more out-of-sector capability than the four divisions
we had there 8 years ago. Our NATO allies are falling
behind technologically, a development driven by the
reduced resources allocated for defense. For example, the
percentage of GDP going into defense in Germany has
declined over the last 8 years from 3 percent down to about
1-1/2 percent. This decline was reflected in Germany’s
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relative contribution to the air and missile campaign in
Kosovo. The United States flew 80 percent of the strike
sorties, 90 percent of the intelligence sorties, and 90 percent
of the electronic warfare sorties. The United States fired a
little over 80 percent of the precision munitions and over 90
percent of the cruise missiles.
While the success of Operation ALLIED FORCE is
further evidence of the steady improvement in the
effectiveness and lethality of air and missile power, there
was still marginal effectiveness of air power against
Serbian forces because they were hard to find and thus hard
to hit. The Kosovo Liberation Army, acting as a surrogate
ground force, finally flushed them out and made them mass.
As they began to move, they became easier to hit by air
forces.
What appeared to be a tardy deployment of Task Force
Hawk into northern Albania highlighted a growing
perception that the Army remained something of a strategic
dinosaur. The Army needs to restructure itself now rather
than postponing its restructuring until the Army After Next
(AAN). That sentiment is not intended to denigrate the
AAN. Conceptualizing the AAN was a valuable intellectual
exercise, and the Army should receive immense credit for
energetically thinking about the future. But there are a
reshaping and refocusing that need to happen in the Army
today.
During Operation ALLIED FORCE, most of the NATO
air forces were unable to fight beside the U.S. Air Force.
There is thus the need for a comprehensive modernization
program for key European allies, and there’s the need for
realistic U.S. planning to integrate low- and medium-level
technology forces with American high-tech forces to produce
an effective capability for coalition warfare. Ideally, we
would like all our allies to have high-tech forces, but in the
meanwhile, we must do a better job blending high- and
low-tech forces.
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In what other ways should future forces change?
Certainly they have to be smaller, more mobile, more
rapidly deployable. Yet they have to be more potent, more
capable of achieving decisive effects. They have to be
maintained at a high state of readiness, eliminating the
train-and-decay syndrome. The focus of these forces will be
the Article 5 heritage of collective defense, providing a
hedge against uncertainty. The size of that collective
defense effort will be regulated by our considered evaluation
of the Russian threat.
The Alliance of the future must also prepare for
non-Article 5 missions and out-of-area operations. It must
be prepared to integrate new members. It must attend to the
growing strategic importance of Turkey and the southern
periphery. Our continued dependence on petroleum
products will bring greater recognition of Turkey’s critical
role as a gateway to Asia. It will also sensitize us to the fact
that future threats to Europe will in all likelihood be
preponderantly on the southern periphery.
Thus, as noted above, future forces should be designed to
support a hedging strategy. They would retain some
conventional defense capabilities based on our perception of
the threat from Russia, but there would be a major
reorientation of our headquarters and forces toward greater
adaptivity through the entire spectrum of military
operations.
As we adapt and shape forces for the future, we need to
continually analyze the asymmetric responses our forces
will meet. We need to ensure that we’re able to deal
effectively with each of them. For example, we must be
prepared to counter cyberwar, that is, attacks on our
computer systems that support particularly critical and
vulnerable functions such as planning, force projection,
energy grids, and so forth. We must be able to deal with
terrorist attacks, both at home and in Europe, asking
ourselves realistically how such attacks will affect civilian
populations. The huge and growing threat of missile attack
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and use of weapons of mass destruction must be dealt with.
If we can’t deal with them, the Alliance will crack. Many
future operations will be conducted in urban
settings—witness Somalia and Chechnya. Such warfare
presents special problems that must be anticipated and
prepared for. Finally, how do we deal with politically
unengageable targets? What do we do with an enemy who
puts artillery systems next to schools and hospitals, or
scatters civilians or refugees in and around tactical
vehicles? We will have to decide whether nonlethal means
would be appropriate to counter such tactics and, if so, what
forms the nonlethal means should take.
As we shape forces for the future, we must capitalize on
insights drawn from recent operations such as ALLIED
FORCE. First, we need to analyze the advantages and
disadvantages of publicly announcing our game plan and
self-imposed operational limitations in advance. How
willing in the future should we be to telegraph our intent?
Second, we need to reexamine the practice of finding and
striking industrial and commercial targets within the
civilian sector. This practice might prove to be
counterproductive, especially over the longer term. 1 Third,
we must come to terms with the reality that long-range
bombers with precision munitions can realize their
tremendous utility on the future battlefield only after
mobile tactical targets have been forced to move and mass.
Scattered enemy forces in hidden locations remain
relatively immune. Fourth, we note that ground forces need
to be positioned early and within operational reach of the
enemy. By doing so, we preserve an important political and
strategic lever that could contribute to the early
termination of conflict. Fifth, we find that joint—repeat
joint—application of military force is more likely to achieve
political objectives rapidly and decisively. Single-service
solutions lack the versatility, tailorability, and
comprehensiveness inherent in the application of
full-spectrum violence against the enemy’s will. Moreover,
if force is worth using at all, it should be applied early and
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decisively. The technique of expanding the violence of the
attack in piecemeal driblets was discredited in Vietnam, but
the lesson still seems not to have sunk in.
What are the changes for U.S. forces in general? Our
forces have to have an adaptive structure to accomplish all
missions: integration missions on behalf of forces of states
applying for NATO membership, Article 5 missions,
out-of-area operational missions, and missions descending
all the way down to the lower end of the spectrum, such as
humanitarian, peacekeeping, peacemaking, etc. We need to
ensure that U.S. forces are able to adapt to Alliance
structures and procedures so that we retain our Alliance
cohesion. There will be continued European reliance upon
America’s unique strategic reach and access. One example
is space, though the Europeans are likely to enter this
domain somewhat more ambitiously in the next century.
Another example is troop and materiel lift, which remains a
sine qua non for out-of-sector operations. There will be a
force structure bill we have to pay, compensating for the
differing capabilities and technology levels of our NATO
allies. We’ll have to form liaison cells to serve as surrogates
for interoperability. To meet the full spectrum of military
obligations, NATO will have to exercise creative ingenuity
in fashioning the best mix of forces for particular missions.
With regard to U.S. Army forces, they need to be
restructured now, not later, a point made earlier but
repeated here for emphasis. They have to have
full-spectrum capability, which will entail medium and
light forces as well as mobile theater missile defense forces.
There has to be a better balance between speed and
decisiveness, allowing us to get to the fight more rapidly but
with the wherewithal to defend ourselves and do the job. For
example, our future cannon artillery system, the Crusader,
was designed for yesterday’s fight and not for tomorrow’s.
Because of its weight and size, we cannot get it to distant
battlefields easily. In the expeditionary operations of the
future, often in austere environments and where time is of
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the essence, there will be a huge reliance on early-arriving
active forces. We need to structure accordingly.
Air Force capabilities need to be reprioritized. Strategic
lift, heavy bombers, UAVs, and space systems are vitally
important, serving as highly leveraged enablers in future
operations. We need to begin reexamining other
programs—for example, the tactical fighter programs—and
reassess them in light of the threat and geostrategic
environment that we’ll likely confront.
To sum up, U.S. forces in Europe haven’t been reshaped
to meet the challenges and demands entailed by the future
geostrategic environment. The Army has to get to the battle
quickly, but still with decisive force. There is a direct
correlation that we find in our gaming between the length of
time it takes to get to the fight and how long the fight will
last. Delay translates to prolongation of the war.
Air Force programs should be restructured to reflect an
early 21st-century environment. Moreover, we need to
redefine air superiority. Air superiority now and in the
future is more than superiority over manned aircraft. We
have to have superiority over the whole spectrum of missile
threats also. European forces in general must be
modernized in such a way that they rapidly begin to close
the technology gap existing among the national forces. With
such steps as these, NATO can expect to meet whatever
challenges are presented over the next decade and a half.
ENDNOTE - CHAPTER 10
1. See, for example, Bradley Graham, “Report Says NATO Bombing
Killed 500 Civilians in Yugoslavia,” The Washington Post, February 7,
2000, p. A2.
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CHAPTER 11
AMERICA’S DIMINISHING COMMITMENT
TO NATO: IMPLICATIONS
FOR SERVICE FORCE STRUCTURE
John J. Mearsheimer
In this chapter, I examine the question of where the
United States is likely to go over the next 20 years with its
force structure in Europe. My main conclusions are, first,
that the size of the U.S. military commitment to Europe is
likely to shrink steadily over time, and second, that the Air
Force is likely be the dominant service in Europe during this
time, at the expense of the Army. I should emphasize that I
have long argued that independent air power usually does
not play a key role in winning wars. Armies and the tactical
air forces that support them are the main determinants of
victory. In short, wars are won on the ground. Nevertheless,
with regard to the question at hand—U.S. force structure in
Europe over the next 20 years—the future lies more with
the Air Force than the Army.
To approach this question, one first has to inquire about
the strength of the American commitment to Europe. How
tight is the link today? What is likely to happen to that link
in the future? Second, one has to consider the costs of
keeping peace in Europe, because if the U.S. commitment to
Europe is weak, as I argue it is, the United States probably
will not be willing to incur significant costs to be Europe’s
peacekeeper. And if we are not willing to fight and die in
Europe, that has profound implications for U.S. force
structure in that region.
There is no question that Europe, along with Northeast
Asia and the Persian Gulf, is an area of great strategic
importance to the United States. But that fact alone does
not mean that the United States needs to station troops
there. The key issue is whether or not there is a threat in
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Europe that justifies maintaining an American military
commitment. My view is that there is no serious threat to
American interests in Europe today. Nor is there one on the
horizon.
The United States needs a motivating threat for two
reasons. First, the United States is a remarkably secure
great power. Located in the Western Hemisphere, it is
separated from the great powers in Europe and Northeast
Asia by two giant moats (the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans),
and it has a huge nuclear arsenal. Secure great powers
usually do not go looking for fights. Indeed, they try to avoid
them. Second, the costs of modern war are often great, and
committing forces overseas effectively means putting them
in harm’s way. There has to be a powerful motivating force
for Americans, or any other people for that matter, to accept
commitments that might lead to war. I often tell students
that a good way to think about this issue is to see the movie
Saving Private Ryan, and then ask: do we have interests in
Europe today that would justify putting American troops in
that kind of situation?
I believe that there is only one possible threat in Europe
(or Northeast Asia) that would justify an American military
commitment to Europe with its attendant dangers, and that
is the presence of a potential hegemon. Specifically, the
United States does not want any state to dominate Europe
the way it dominates the Western Hemisphere, because
that powerful rival would be a serious threat to the United
States. In contemporary parlance, the United States does
not want a peer competitor. Instead, it wants a balance of
power in Europe. In the event a potential hegemon comes on
the scene, the United States prefers to remain on the
sidelines and let the other great powers in Europe contain it.
But if they cannot do the job, the United States accepts the
responsibility. That is the only circumstance in which the
United States is willing to fight and die in Europe.
Maintaining peace in Europe, while certainly a desirable
American goal, is not important enough to justify engaging
in deadly European wars.
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There is no potential hegemon in Europe today. Russia is
an economic and military weakling. It is certainly no threat
to overrun Europe, and there is little reason to think that it
will be the most powerful state in Europe 20 years from now.
But in the unlikely event that this happens and Russia is
once again a potential hegemon, the other European
powers—Britain, France, Germany, and Italy—should be
able to contain Russia by themselves, and not require help
from the United States as they did between 1945 and 1990.
After all, Germany is now unified and wealthy, which it was
not during the Cold War. Furthermore, Russia has only
about half the population of the former Soviet Union, which
makes it almost impossible for Russia to build a military
machine as powerful as the Red Army. This is not to say that
a wealthy Russia would be a paper tiger, but only to say that
it would not be so formidable that American troops would
have to remain in Europe to contain it.
In the absence of a threat to overrun Europe, it will be
especially difficult over the long term to convince Americans
to pay the costs of keeping troops there and run the risks of
getting caught in a shooting war.
There are four other factors that raise serious doubts
about the viability of the American commitment to Europe.
First, a substantial and growing percentage of the civilian
policymakers who would make the decision to send
American troops into combat have never served in the
military. Nor will most of their children. I believe it would be
difficult for leaders in Congress and the executive branch to
send lower-class and middle-class Americans out to fight
and die when there is no sense of shared risk. Furthermore,
the American military is likely to grow increasingly
distrustful of civilian leaders who lack military experience
and who might be willing to pursue risky strategies because
they would not be putting themselves or their children in
harm’s way. All of this is to say that there better be powerful
reasons for putting the American military into troublespots
around the world. As emphasized, I see no compelling
reason why the United States should fight in Europe.
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Second, I do not think that down the road the United
States is going to be willing to bear the financial costs of
maintaining U.S. forces in Europe. The American economy
is booming at the moment, and with the budget surplus we
now have, it is relatively easy to pay for keeping 100,000
troops in both Europe and Northeast Asia. But hardly
anyone believes that happy situation is going to continue for
the next 2 decades. Somewhere in the not too distant future
the U.S. economy is going to run into trouble and there is
going to be serious pressure to cut defense spending. Calls
for the Europeans to do more for themselves will be heard
loudly and clearly. The problem will be compounded further
when the so-called baby-boomers start retiring after 2011
and begin putting pressure on Social Security, Medicare,
and other entitlement programs.
Third, the United States is likely to focus more attention
on Northeast Asia than Europe in the future, because China
might very well be a potential hegemon that can only be
contained by a balancing coalition that includes the United
States. If China looks like it might be a peer competitor, and
there is no dangerous threat in Europe, the United States
will almost surely shift large numbers of military assets out
out of Europe and into Asia.
Finally, there is the matter of generational change. The
national security establishment is presently dominated by
individuals who came of age during the Cold War, and tend
to see the world very much in terms of that conflict. I include
myself in that category. The American commitment to
Europe was a sacrosanct mission in the Cold War, because
the Soviet military threat was concentrated there.
Consequently, it is difficult for old Cold Warriors like myself
to imagine U.S. troops leaving Europe. However, it is not
likely that the younger generations moving up in our ranks
will feel the same connection to Europe.
Let’s now return to the subject of America’s reluctance to
suffer casualties, focusing specifically on the recent war in
Kosovo. That conflict highlights nicely how little appetite
110

the United States has for playing the role of peacekeeper in
Europe. There is much talk about how the pilots who helped
bring Slobodan Milosevic to heel were heroes. I have great
respect for those airmen, but I am uneasy about calling
them heroes. The Allies flew about 37 thousand sorties in
the conflict, and there was not a single casualty. Moreover,
those airmen were flying over Kosovo while massive ethnic
cleansing was taking place on the ground below. Yet, they
were rarely allowed to fly below 15,000 feet, where they
might have been better able to help the victims, because
Allied leaders feared that they might be shot down. In other
words, the United States and its allies were unwilling to
risk a single life to alleviate the suffering of the Albanians
on the ground.
Furthermore, the Clinton Administration was so
horrified by the thought of using American ground forces in
Kosovo that it said early in the conflict that they would
never be used to invade Kosovo, even though that threat
probably would have helped cause Milosevic to quit the war.
In short, Kosovo provides stark evidence that the United
States is not inclined to fight and die to maintain peace in
Europe.
One might argue that Kosovo was of marginal strategic
significance, and thus is not a good indicator of what the
United States would do if there was a Russian threat, say, to
Poland or the Baltic states. I do not believe, however, that
the American people would be willing to fight and die in
defense of those countries if Russia or any other state
attacked them. We would certainly be concerned if that
happened, and we would protest loudly. But the security of
the United States would not be at risk. Remember that we
were able to manage quite well in the Cold War despite the
fact that the Soviets controlled most of Eastern Europe. As
long as there is no mortal threat to the United States, it is
likely to remain on the sidelines if war breaks out in eastern
Europe.
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What does the foregoing discussion tell us about force
structure? First, the United States is likely to pull its troops
out of Europe over the course of the next two decades,
mainly because there is no threat in the region serious
enough to justify a continued military presence. If a major
war breaks out in Europe, most Americans are likely to say,
“That’s Europe’s war—let them deal with the problem.”
Second, as long as U.S. forces remain in Europe, the Air
Force is likely to play a more important role in the region
than the Army, mainly because the Air Force is invariably
less costly to employ in combat than the Army. Specifically,
there are likely to be fewer American casualties if the
chosen instrument is air power instead of ground power.
The problem with relying largely on air power is that
there are significant limits on what it can do alone to win a
war, especially if the adversary has a formidable military.
Consider the three main cases where the United States has
employed force since the Cold War ended. It conducted a
lengthy bombing campaign against Iraq in early 1991, but
air power alone could not force Saddam Hussein to
capitulate. A ground invasion was necessary to accomplish
that goal. American air power was used again in the late
summer of 1995 in Bosnia to force Milosevic to the
negotiating table. However, it was used in conjunction with
a Croatian and Bosnian ground offensive. Kosovo is the only
case where air power alone might have won a war, although
it is too soon to tell what caused Milosevic to capitulate. It
might be that the KLA’s growing power on the ground,
coupled with a NATO threat to invade Kosovo, turned the
tide. Regardless, these three bombing campaigns against
weak opponents point up the limits of air power.
The American national security establishment is well
aware of this problem and is working hard to develop
sophisticated technologies that can markedly increase the
effectiveness of air power. The evolving Revolution in
Military Affairs (RMA), for example, is part of this effort to
increase the lethality of American air power. An even more
promising solution to this problem is to use American air
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power in combination with the ground forces of an ally. As
noted, this is what happened in Bosnia in 1995. Also, some
argued during the recent war in Kosovo that the United
States should have aggressively armed and trained the
KLA, and then employed American air power to support
KLA offensives against the Serbs.
Actually, the first time the United States employed this
approach to warfighting was in Vietnam in the spring of
1972, when the North Vietnamese launched their famous
Easter Offensive. Most American troops were out of
Vietnam by that point, so the ground war was the
responsibility of the South Vietnamese Army. But the
United States provided its ally with extensive air support
and together they won a clear victory in that campaign.
North Vietnam, however, eventually won the war three
years later in 1975.
In sum, the United States military is likely to exit
Europe over the course of the next 2 decades, mainly
because there is no threat in sight to our vital interests in
that region. But as long as American forces remain in
Europe, U.S. policymakers are not likely to commit their
own ground forces to combat. Indeed, they will probably go
to great lengths to avoid using the U.S. Army in combat in
Europe. When trouble starts, they will instead try to win the
war with American air power employed in conjunction with
another state’s ground forces.
QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, AND COMMENTARY,
CHAPTERS 9, 10, AND 11
QUESTION. With the huge gap between funds required
for military modernization and funds actually slated, aren’t
we in the position of not being able to get there from here?
Lieutenant General McInerney. Clearly, all services are
facing certain budgetary strains. That’s one of the reasons
why we need to reduce our huge infrastructural and
administrative tail, enabling us to transfer money from the
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noncore business to the core business side. It will be a
challenge. No question about it. It’s going to take a lot of
leadership, and it’s going to require different ways of
handling the problem. But it can be solved.
Lieutenant General Garner. It takes money. The
services are underfunded today, and the Army faces the
huge problem of not being able to modernize and
recapitalize the force. In fact, it’s almost impossible. It will
require fundamental redesign of the force to get us out from
under that economic burden. It’s getting more difficult to
recruit because the economy is humming. The repetitive
deployments that soldiers make result in great pressures on
them from their families to get out, especially since soldiers
are not making the money their civilian counterparts are.
The quality of life facilities are underfunded. Housing
repairs have been put off. Quality of life is poor. We have a
force that’s getting extremely old. Yet, in replacing that old
force we have to build a new type of force that is more rapidly
deployable but at the same time is more decisive than the
old one was, all in the face of huge problems in recruiting,
retention, deployment hardships, and quality-of-life
detractors. To meet such challenges will take money.
For the Army, the first area we have to look at is our
internal management, trying to increase the productivity of
our recruiting force. Over the last 4 or 5 years, the
proportion of graduating high school seniors going on to
college has increased from a little over 40 percent to over 60
percent. We’ve lost a third of the market. We have to figure
out how we can attract those who have some college. What is
it we can offer a young man or woman with some college
background? We have to look to their aspirations and the
skills they bring and rethink the issue of our grade
structure. We have in the form of warrant ranks a whole
class of military positions that could be reassessed, creating
an attractive opportunity to bring highly qualified people
into our service. We must keep them dedicated to the
technologies we need, particularly information age
technologies, but treat them in a way more commensurate
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with their needs, aspirations, and skills. I think those are
the kinds of opportunities we have.
Fortunately, the Army enjoys retention rates in excess of
what our original goals were. If we can get young men and
women through their first 4-year commitments, well over
half of them will then stay with us. So we’re doing something
right in terms of the experience we’re giving our
first-termers. The problem is to attract them in the first
place. The biggest challenge in that regard is to meet the
aspirations of those who are now going on to community
colleges and will have technical degrees.
QUESTION. Why are we still struggling with inefficient
and expensive government in view of the highly publicized
initiatives on reinventing government?
Lieutenant General McInerney. An organization can be
changed only if change is driven from the top—with
conviction. The Pentagon bureaucracy knows the
mandatory retirement dates of military drivers, and they
know how long a politician willing to shake things up is
going to be around. The bureaucracy can drag things out
until the drivers depart the scene and thus prevent needed
reforms from happening. Moreover, we must stop
competing with the private sector in areas where the private
sector can do it better. For example, in the Army’s logistics
modernization, an excellent decision was made to buy a
commercial system off the shelf. That decision had to be
driven from the top.
We’re not getting enough of that type of forceful and
courageous leadership. There is a paralyzing political
concern over civilian jobs. But we’ve closed 97 bases, with
80 percent of those having been fully closed. We now have
more people from the private sector working on those closed
bases than when the government workers were there.
They’re putting taxable dollars into the community rather
than having their wages paid by the government. We know
how to achieve these soft landings and humane job
transitions. But we lack the political will. When it comes to
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bucking the government workers’ unions, no meaningful
initiative gets out of the Clinton White House. They are not
biting the tough bullets. We’re going to have to solve these
problems no matter who the next president might be.
Lieutenant General Garner. Unfortunately, within the
defense establishment itself, part of the culture works
against a solution. We could achieve enormous savings in
defense infrastructure if we contracted more work out to
civilian organizations. But what often happens is that those
government organizations that are good candidates for
outsourcing belong to someone in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense. They are his empire—his turf—and he feels
compelled to protect them. The services can’t get at those.
Take, for example, Jacques Gansler, now the highly
respected DoD acquisition executive. Before, when Gansler
served on the Defense Science Board, he looked at these
infrastructures and found that we could save about 44
billion dollars by civilianizing them and then applying the
money to core service programs. But now that he’s a
member of the Defense hierarchy, he can’t find one dollar.
Professor Mearsheimer. There’s not much hope for
reform of the services and the Pentagon more generally, in
large part because of the rather benign threat environment
we operate in today The best way to get at this problem is to
think about it in terms of interest-group politics. Inside the
national security establishment, there are different interest
groups, like DoD, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines.
Then, inside each service we have another layer of interest
groups—strategic bombers versus tactical aircraft, light
infantry versus mechanized infantry versus armor, and so
forth. These various groups have selfish and clashing
interests. To bring order to this sprawling structure and
make it work efficiently, there has to be a significant
external threat that makes it imperative to meld the groups
into a lean and mean fighting force. In fact, there is a large
literature on this subject, which concludes that militaries
tend to operate efficiently only in a high-threat environment
where a state’s survival is on the line. In extremis, you can’t
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afford to let the individual bureaucracies behave in selfish
and foolish ways. But we live in a low-threat environment
today. Consequently, it is unlikely that anyone is going to be
able to force effective reform on the Department of Defense.
Not surprisingly, the Quadrennial Defense Review was a
futile exercise in reform. Future efforts of that kind are not
likely to be much more successful.
QUESTION. Isn’t it the case that the potential
employment of ground forces in Kosovo by NATO was what
ultimately brought Milosevic to capitulate, and not the
application of air power? Given that ground forces cannot
be moved quickly to vital areas overseas, isn’t it wise to
retain significant ground forces forward-deployed in such
areas? Don’t they provide a large measure of insurance?
Professor Mearsheimer. It is hard to make a judgment at
this time on what caused Milosevic to capitulate. We just
don’t have enough information about his decisionmaking
calculus. We certainly can come up with plausible
explanations, but until we get some concrete evidence from
him or the people around him, it’s impossible to say for sure
what happened.
I do think that the threat of a ground invasion is an
excellent way to deal with problems like Kosovo.
Nevertheless, I think it will be difficult to convince the
American people to keep ground troops forward-deployed in
Europe so that they can be used in future Kosovos. We have
managed to keep U.S. troops in Europe since 1990 because it
has not been costly to us—at least not up to now. Paying the
bills has been easy becuse of the prosperity of the Clinton
years, and the human costs have been remarkably low.
Remember, we lost no lives in the Kosovo war. But we may
not always be so lucky. If we continue conducting
out-of-area missions and humanitarian missions like
Kosovo, we risk losing American lives, which I believe will
undermine the American commitment to Europe, making it
impossible to maintain a presence there over the long term.
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QUESTION. Setting aside the specific issue of opposing a
potential hegemon, doesn’t our continued presence in and
commitment to Europe provide a general sense of
continuing stability there? Doesn’t it forestall European
wars that we might otherwise be drawn into?
Professor Mearsheimer. Looking historically at the
American commitment to Europe, as well as the British
commitment to the continent, it is apparent that we both get
drawn into European wars only when there is a potential
hegemon on the continent. The British stayed off the
continent from 1815, when Napoleon was finally defeated,
until the early 20th century, because there was no potential
hegemon in Europe. In particular, they did not get involved
in the German wars of unification against Austria (1866)
and France (1870), because Germany was not a potential
hegemon at that point. It is potential hegemons like
Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany,
and the post-1945 Soviet Union that bring Britain and the
United States into Europe’s major wars.
Lieutenant General McInerney. Let me return to the
earlier issue of air power versus ground power. Air power
was successful in Kosovo, but that model will not become
universal. The new Army, by adjusting its force structure,
will be more mobile and more responsive. True, air power
can be brought forward a lot quicker than the Army. But
Army forces stationed in Europe will still play a dominant
role in central Europe through their reinforcement
capability. The ability to project a more mobile force from
that area to sites elsewhere in Europe or outside of Europe is
indispensable.
QUESTION. Wouldn’t prospects for world peace be
strengthened if the United States remained disposed to
defend forward and nip wars in the bud before they become
great wars?
Professor Mearsheimer. The United States is not in the
business of nipping great-power wars in the bud. It deploys
forces forward to contain potential hegemons from
118

dominating areas like Europe and Northeast Asia and
becoming peer competitors of the United States. If there is
no peer competitor on the horizon in either Europe or
Northeast Asia, the United States is likely to retreat to the
Western Hemisphere and maintain few, if any, military
forces in those regions. That has certainly been the pattern
of American behavior in the past. Our military commitment
to Europe and Northeast Asia in peacetime during the Cold
War was not the norm; it was a historical anomaly. China
might become a potential peer competitor, however, and if
that happens the United States will probably keep troops in
Northeast Asia to contain China.
Let me unpack my argument a bit. The United States
and Britain, like all great powers, have perfected the art of
buck-passing when it comes to containing dangerous
adversaries. Specifically, America’s goal is to get other
states to do the fighting and dying for as long as possible,
and to intervene only when it is essential to protect the
balance of power. For example, the United States
understood clearly in the early 20 th century that Wilhelmine
Germany was a serious threat to dominate Europe. We
were perfectly content, however, to let France, Russia, and
Britain deal with the problem while we remained on the
sidelines. We finally entered World War I in April
1917—almost 3 years after it started—only because it
looked like Germany was going to win the war and become a
peer competitor.
We repeated the same pattern when confronted with
Nazi Germany. Americans like to talk about how moral and
idealistic the United States is when it comes to foreign
policy. Yet, what did we do when Adolph Hitler came to
power in 1933? Nothing. What did we do when he started
World War II in 1939? Nothing. What turned American
policy around was the fall of France in May-June 1940;
Hitler was then free to attack the Soviet Union without a
second front, and we thought Nazi Germany was likely to
win that fight. We feared that Adolph Hitler would do what
Kaiser Wilhelm was unable to do: establish German
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hegemony in Europe, creating a peer competitor for the
United States. So the United States began feverishly
preparing for war. We were not guided by noble ideals in our
dealings with Nazi Germany. We were motivated instead
by the logic of realpolitik.
In short, we find a powerful impulse in the United States
to pass the buck to other states when faced with a potential
aggressor. This same impulse is found in Britain, which is
why, going back to the 17 th century, it has often been
referred to by its European neighbors as perfidious Albion.
Like Britain, the United States is a balancer of last resort in
Europe. We come in at the last moment and only when we
have no choice.
Did we come in too late in World War II, as some suggest?
No. Our timing was almost perfect. In World War II, the
key issue was which state would pay the awful blood price of
beating down the German Wehrmacht. Better the Soviet
Union than the United States. Appropriately, it was
preferable to invade the continent at Normandy in 1944,
rather than 1943 or, even worse, 1942. The best strategy
from an American perspective was to let the Wehrmacht and
the Red Army fight for a few years and then for the United
States to come onto the continent when the Germans were
on the ropes and win the peace. Again, that is how Britain
and the United States have tended to operate in the past.
The historical record is clear on this. Some might say that if
the United States had intervened in Europe in the 1930s,
there would have been no World War II. Maybe. Maybe not.
But if the United States had tried but failed to prevent
World War II, it would have been in the thick of the fighting
from the beginning of the war, and many more Americans
would have died than was actually the case.
Lieutenant General McInerney. I am glad not a lot of
Americans share the foregoing view. We have all heard of
the enormous degree of economic interdependence between
Europe and the United States. These ties are a reflection of
the internationalist stance of American businessmen as
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well as the American government. Isolationists are fond of
claiming that the growing economic ties got us into World
War II. But internationalism has been very successful since
1945. We’ve had our problems. But clearly the greatest
success has been in Europe, and we should continue with
the recipe. Fundamentally, the successful recipe is to
remain engaged in Europe with a strategic partner that
thinks the way we do, that has great wealth, and that in
union with us provides a very stabilizing force for the world
and the future. The American people that I know will go out
and fight for what’s right, as will the Europeans, and they’ve
proved it.
QUESTION. Isn’t the policy of disengagement, save for
periods when we’re faced with a hegemon or peer
competitor, more representative of the attitudes in
Congress than those in the executive branch?
Professor Mearsheimer. Yes, I think that the present
administration is less interested in scaling back our
commitment to Europe than is Congress, although there are
members of Congress who are quite interventionist in their
outlook. But I should emphasize that I am making what is
basically a structural argument, which is to say that
particular individuals and administrations don’t have that
much influence on what happens regarding the
commitment of American forces to Europe. My argument is
that powerful structural forces at play in the international
system and in the United States are going to make it
difficult for any President, whether it is Bill Clinton or a
Republican, to maintain forces in Europe (and Northeast
Asia) in the absence of a potential hegemon. Franklin D.
Roosevelt was certainly internationalist in his inclinations
in the late 1930s, but he could not act on his inclinations
until the fall of France in June 1940 created a situation
where it looked like Germany might overrun all of Europe.
QUESTION. You don’t see a difference between attitudes
of the presidency and attitudes in Congress, generally
speaking?
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Professor Mearsheimer. Yes, I do, as I said earlier.
General Naumann. We know what President
Roosevelt’s intention was—it was to build a world safe for
democracy. If the United States no longer accepts that
ideal, it will never have troops in Europe or Northeast Asia.
But I believe it does. The international structures and
institutions erected to assure a stable and peaceful world
are not built of stone. We can change them as circumstances
dictate to better adapt to current realities. It may well be
that at some point in the future America’s force
commitment to Europe could be adjusted downward, but
only after we have created the proper conditions.
Professor Mearsheimer. I understand the argument that
this is a period of profound change and that the United
States has an opportunity to shape it in positive ways by
staying put in Europe and working closely with its allies to
spread norms of cooperation and build powerful institutions
that can promote peace. But to be honest, I look at
international politics in a very different way. I think that
states are selfish actors who rarely behave in altruistic
fashion. The United States, for example, is mainly
concerned with enhancing its own interests, which means
making sure it remains the most powerful state in the
world. As an American, I believe that is a wise goal, because
it enhances the security of the United States. Of course,
many people believe that such views are outmoded in the
post-Cold War world. I think they are wrong, but only time
will tell whether there has been a real revolution in
international politics.
QUESTION. Where do the French fit into the puzzle of
European security?
Professor Mearsheimer. Throughout most of the Cold
War, the French had mixed feelings about the American
military presence in Europe. They preferred for the most
part a European defense identity independent of the United
States. But the French appear to have changed their
thinking on this matter in the wake of the Cold War. They
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are not trying to decouple the United States from Europe.
While France is not as interested as Britain and Germany in
keeping the Americans in Europe, the French are at least
not trying to push us back across the Atlantic. However,
French thinking could change in the next few years, as they
have never been fully comfortable with an American
military presence in Europe.
QUESTION. Are there any plans to bring Slobodan
Milosevic before the International Court of Justice at The
Hague?
Professor Mearsheimer. No firm decision has been made,
but investigators are gathering evidence on alleged war
crimes by Milosevic and his lieutenants. But even if they are
eventually indicted, it is not clear that they will be brought
to trial.
QUESTION. How do the Guard and Reserve fit into the
force structure equation?
Lieutenant General McInerney. The Guard and Reserve
play an important role. The Air Force is using Guard and
Reserve forces at an increasing rate, and they will be
integral to any Air Force military involvement overseas.
Lieutenant General Garner. The Army Reserve, the
Army National Guard, and the active Army are going to be
together. We can’t fight a war without all three of them
there. As we redesign the active component, the National
Guard will have to mirror that modernization. Thus as we
divest ourselves of heavy systems in the active Army, we
will have to do the same thing in the National Guard,
putting them on the modernization ramp with the active
Army.
The Army Reserve will go through a period of redefining
and reestablishing its core competencies. The Reserve
offers tremendous utility, but we had it doing so many
different things that we now need to see where we can
consolidate its activities and thus get better use. We’ve
probably taken the Reserve down further than we should
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have. We hope to have solutions emerging over about the
next 3 or 4 years.
General Saint. Is the military budget going to get worse?
Absolutely. On the other hand, has the future of the U.S.
military presence in Europe been decided? No, it has not
been decided. But there has been a change in U.S.
philosophy regarding Europe. The United States, along
with the Europeans, made a considered decision that what
was happening in Kosovo was so unspeakably outrageous
that we would not let it continue regardless of whether it
was occurring in a sovereign country outside NATO. We
thus decided to intervene. True, the timing and means by
which we intervened, all dictated by political
considerations, were not such that we were able to prevent
significant additional suffering and atrocities. We still have
a guilty conscience about that. But we were successful in
evicting Serb forces from Kosovo and returning the
Kosovars to their homes under conditions of security and
hope.
Is Europe still important? It remains important for a
variety of reasons. The economic reasons are obvious, but
there are other factors that link us to Europe. For example,
there are more Poles in Chicago than there are in Warsaw;
there are more Croats in Pennsylvania than there are in
Croatia, or nearly so. Such affinities generate felt
obligations on the part of the United States. When overseas
kin of U.S. citizens are in danger, an American response has
been predictable.
Europe is important as well for geostrategic reasons.
Will NATO, with U.S. participation, have new missions?
Yes. However, we have lost the predictability of the Cold
War. We knew who the enemy was. Every unit in the Army
had a wartime mission in a particular geographic location.
Each unit knew who the enemy was on the other side of the
boundary, and it trained for the encounter. We do not have
an identified enemy today. Thus there is a level of
uncertainty throughout the Army as to which enemy our
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units are to train to fight. They are reduced to training to
achieve certain specified capabilities. That’s not sufficient
when you’re trying to justify your existence, but it is true
that we have to train for capabilities.
For example, we must have mobility, and we want to
capitalize on technology so that we put people in harm’s way
only to the minimum extent necessary. The proportion of
soldiers who were within musket range in the Civil War was
quite high. The proportion of soldiers subject to direct fire
nowadays is far smaller. We would rather have fewer
people up front where the bullets are thickest and more in
the back. This doesn’t mean we should neglect working to
reduce the tail. But there’s a logic to what we try to do. We
try to shoot the enemy from longer distances so that the
likelihood of his shooting us is a lot less. In Operation
DESERT STORM, U.S. Army tanks were killing Iraqi tanks
at well over 3,000 meters, and the Iraqis didn’t even know
our tanks were there. The maximum range of Iraqi tanks is
about 2,000 meters, two-thirds of a mile less than ours. They
were sitting there eating their couscous when all of a sudden
their tanks started blowing up around them. That was a bit
unnerving, so technology does serve a useful purpose.
Our technology affects our force structure and our
capability to perform. Where is our force structure going? If
we are going to have a variety of missions along the
spectrum of conflict—interventions ranging from sending a
platoon of medics to the Horn of Africa to teach inhabitants
how to perform preventive medicine, to an observer mission
such as we perform in the Egyptian Sinai, to some
medium-level conflict like Kosovo, to major theater war like
that in the Gulf—then we will require flexible forces capable
of being tailored to meet these different challenges.
The United States does not like to fight alone. It doesn’t
make good sense to fight alone. It was once said that the only
thing more difficult than fighting alone is fighting in a
coalition. But fighting in a coalition is far superior to
fighting alone. I never really understood that until I became
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a NATO commander. Some national units didn’t perform as
well as others, and I had a tendency to grouse about that. A
military colleague took me aside and said, “Butch, you don’t
understand. These are the people you’re going to fight
alongside of. These are your compatriots. And if you take
this suspect battalion out of the force structure, you will
have to replace it with an American battalion or do without.”
I saw the light. We can’t get along without the Alliance, and
we can’t get along without friends of like mind, those who
believe in justice, the rule of law, and human dignity.
Admittedly, we’re not going to be part of an alliance
during every military action that we as a nation decide to
undertake. Thus the Army will need some kind of tailorable
force structure which, combined with Air Force, Navy, and
Marine complements as appropriate, will form a package
that can fight without allies and accomplish the job it is
assigned to do.
In alliance theory, the commander ought to be able to
take three F-16s, four tanks, three bulldozers, and an Aegis
cruiser and make a task force out of them. Then, again in
theory, the commander should be able to turn a dial and
reconfigure that task force for an entirely different mission.
There is no technical reason why those two actions are
problematic except the friction in our Alliance
bureaucracies. Such friction can be prohibitive, and
sometimes the simplest-sounding Alliance actions become
undoable. For example, language problems are fairly
manageable at the corps level when coordinating a plan
because you have a couple of days to work it out. But
working out a language problem at squad level when
somebody’s shooting at you and you have about 30 seconds
to react is a horse of a different color. We’re working to
overcome such frictions in NATO.
Our ability to interoperate and cooperate when our vital
interests are at stake is very key. I’ll illustrate this with a
true story from my own experience. During preparations for
DESERT STORM in 1990, I got a phone call from General
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Carl Vuono, the Army Chief of Staff. He said, “Saint, can
you send a division to Saudi Arabia in 60 days?” I said,
“Well, Chief, I really think they need a corps. From what I
can tell about the situation, they need a command and
control element and about two divisions from me, and you
can provide another one from the States.” “I think you’re
right,” he said, “I’ll call you back.” Later he called me and
said, “Yes, we need a corps. Can you send a corps in 60 days.”
I said, “Yes, if you will take care of the politics, and if
Washington stays off our backs and lets us get on with our
business.”
Now let me zero in on the part of the story showing the
importance for American commanders to be on close
friendly terms with their Alliance colleagues, a relationship
that derives from our having troops in Europe alongside the
allied troops they’ll be operating with. I made four phone
calls, one to a Dutchman, one to a Belgian, and two to
Germans. They were the territorial commanders through
whose jurisdictions this 200,000 tons of ammunition, 33,000
soldiers, etc. were going to pass within 30 to 45 days. I said,
“Hans, I have a big problem. This is Friday night. On
Monday we’re going to have to start some big-time moving.
Can I send somebody to see you?” Hans said, “Absolutely.
Eight o’clock in the morning, I’ll see your man in my office,
up north, near the border.” So we sent somebody up there.
By Monday morning we had troops on the move.
Now what if I had had to say to Hans, “Good day, General
so-and-so, my name is General Saint. We have never met
before, but, pardon me, I would like to borrow all your
trains, stop all your highway movement, close down your
port, change the priority of shipments on the canals, and I’ll
be along to talk to you about it and we’ll sign a contract on
Monday.” Could we have pulled that off if at every level of
our army in Europe we had not had close, long-standing
relationships with the appropriate Dutch, Belgian, and
German officials? Absolutely not. If we want cooperation
from our European allies, we’re going to have to stay there
and demonstrate a level of interest that says we’re serious.
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We can’t fly in and fly out, steam in and steam out. We have
to be there so they can see us and get to know us and believe
that we are there for the long haul.
In dealing with conflict in Europe, it is in the best
interests of the United States to plan ahead by supporting
and remaining at the forefront of the combined institutional
arrangements to resolve such conflict, rather than
remaining on our own shores in splendid isolation, deigning
to intervene in Europe on an ad hoc basis through occasional
crisis management scenarios. Admittedly, there is not
going to be a war in central Europe, but it is very unstable
around the periphery. It is emphatically in America’s
interests to keep a strong enough hand in the game to
assure that the peripheral instability is not allowed to
destabilize the vital center.
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CHAPTER 12
WHITHER THE U.S.-NATO PARTNERSHIP:
CONSENSUS AND DISSENT
Lloyd J. Matthews
The Cold War is now 10 years behind us, the Warsaw
Pact is a distant memory, the Soviet empire is irretrievably
shattered, communism is passé, the consumptive Russian
bear remains in fretful hibernation, while Operations
DESERT STORM in the Gulf and ALLIED FORCE in the
former Yugoslavia stand as storied testaments to the
decisive superiority of Western arms. Why, then, have
grand strategists and defense policymakers become so
neurotically worried about our future? Why has the
American stance vis-à-vis NATO become so contentious? 1
The answer lies in a simple seven-letter word—history.
Historically, reluctant Americans have manned the
bastions only when the Huns were at the gate: Europe in the
Great War, 1917; Europe in World War II, 1944; Europe in
the Cold War, 1949. When victory was secured and the Huns
retreated, Americans breathed a sigh of relief, drew down
their forces, and came scrambling home: Europe, 1919-20;
Europe 1945-47; Europe, 1992-93. True, NATO remained in
place after the Cold War expired, and the United States,
having been burned in the past, bestirred itself to leave a
modest residual force of some 112,000 military personnel on
the Continent. But with the actual commitment of those
forces to wars in Bosnia and Serbia, America’s traditional
aloofness to foreign entanglements found new voice, and the
issue of whether we should maintain a permanent
complement to Europe’s own indigenous defenders has
risen once again.
The debate surrounding this issue can be glimpsed in
terms of its two polar positions, with various gradations in
between. On one pole are those who support a powerful
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continued U.S. presence in NATO and who hold the
corollary view that NATO should for the present supplant
its now-dated Cold War anti-Soviet mission with that of
securing political and humanitarian order in outlying areas
where instability could adversely affect interests of the
North Atlantic region or outrage its moral sensibilities.
On the other pole are those who believe that the
Europeans are quite capable of waging their own wars and
that the United States should accordingly draw back and
tend its own garden, refusing to be pulled into overseas
embroilments not of its own making and having dubious
connections to its security. This cause has been injected into
the U.S. 2000 presidential campaign by aspiring Reform
Party candidate Patrick Buchanan, but it is embraced by
some in the mainstream parties who otherwise have little or
no ideological affinity for Mr. Buchanan’s political agenda.
Let us first examine the school advocating a robust U.S. role
in an activist NATO. Perhaps the most forceful and
eloquent upholder of this position is U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations Richard Holbrooke.
In his oft-noted book To End a War (1998), Mr.
Holbrooke’s account of the negotiations to stop the fighting
in Bosnia, he refers emphatically to the United States as a
“European power.” 2 This catchy locution is not of course
literally true, certainly not in a geographical sense nor even
in a political or economic sense, despite the extensive
economic interdependence between the two sides of the
North Atlantic and despite the strong political, cultural,
and ethnic ties of long standing. No one would cavil at such a
figure were it a mere harmless exaggeration made for
rhetorical emphasis, but Mr. Holbrooke goes on to invest it
with a measure of specific content quite far-reaching in its
policy implications. Attend carefully as he here summarizes
what it means for the United States to define itself as a
European power:
The circumstances that led to the collapse of Yugoslavia and the
war in Bosnia were so extraordinary that it is difficult to
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conceive of their recurrence. Yet if history teaches us one
thing, it is that history is unpredictable. There will be other
Bosnia’s in our lives, different in every detail but similar in one
overriding manner: they will originate in distant and
ill-understood places, explode with little warning, and present
the rest of the world with difficult choices—choices between
risky involvement and potentially costly neglect. But if during
the Cold War Washington sometimes seemed too ready to
intervene, today America and its allies often seem too willing
to ignore problems outside their heartland. There will be other
Bosnias in our lives—areas where early outside involvement
can be decisive, and American leadership will be required.3

Mr. Holbrooke speaks here for the interventionist school
of American foreign policy, those who readily tend to
perceive threats to American security whenever serious
instability manifests itself on foreign shores, particularly
along the verge of greater Europe. Those who hold such
views are doubtless correct in prophesying future Bosnias in
“distant and ill-understood places,” but they are perhaps
less persuasive in predicating American involvement in
those Bosnias upon claims that American interests therein
are identical to Europe’s.
To argue plausibly for a substantial unity of interests
between the United States and the European bloc of
nations, one would have to be able to demonstrate that the
political and economic fates of the two are inextricably and
uniquely bound together and that the security concerns of
the two are essentially coextensive. However, no
one—REPEAT no one—can demonstrate the truth of these
prepositions, nor can anyone demonstrate that America’s
position would ultimately be enhanced if it accepted and
acted upon such ideas. The fact is that our long-term
interests are devilishly difficult to sort out.
Were the United States to undertake literally the role of
European power with its accompanying European
perspective and orientation, as opposed, say, to its currently
professed role of generic global power, the elements of risk
and uncertainty attendant upon such a scenario would be
131

considerable. As Michael Roskin has pointed out in a cogent
analysis, the future direction of Europe rests upon three
determinative variables. Will Europe successfully unify or
not? Will Germany ascend to the position of Continental
leader or not? Will Russia in the fullness of time assume a
constructive role in the Western community of nations or
not?4 We don’t presently know the answer to any of these
questions.
Assuming that the United States were welcomed with
open arms by the other European powers in any decision to
become something significantly more than the leading
alliance partner—and this is an extremely dubious
assumption—then we could perhaps safely dodge some of
the issues inherent in Professor Roskin’s thorny questions. 5
But in that case we would be immediately confronted by a
host of new and equally discomfiting questions elsewhere in
the world, unloosed from Pandora’s box by the U.S.
declaration that it was henceforth casting its lot with
Europe. The delicate balance of security understandings
patiently and painstakingly reached by the United States
and its worldwide partners over the last half century is not
something to be tampered with lightly. Once a big log is
pulled from the bottom of the pile, we simply can’t predict
how far and where the other logs will roll. By the same
token, once the United States imparts a major disturbance
to international security understandings that have served it
long and well, we can’t foresee all the primary effects, let
alone the secondary and tertiary ripples.
Academics, think-tankers, journalists, and other
commentators have the luxury of forming opinions now,
often very strong opinions, and stating them in categorical
terms. However, policymakers, regardless of their
pretensions to clairvoyance, will need to approach in a more
cautious vein the weighty question of whether the United
States should exchange nuptial vows with Europe.
Promising suitors abound, and the United States as a global
power may find it more fitting to play the field. Any singular
commitment, unwisely made, could do the nation harm and
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deny it the fruits of a better future in other areas of the
world that steadily grow in importance. Thus, to return to
Richard Holbrooke’s proposition, should the United States
indeed define itself as the alpha male within the European
tribe and then begin to act accordingly? One’s answer to this
question will in all likelihood condition his reading of the
future U.S. military presence in Europe.
There can be little denying that NATO, the principal
instrument through which the United States has
manifested its military presence in Europe since the
Alliance’s inception in 1949, has been a smashing success,
at least through November 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell
and the Soviet Union itself came tumbling down 2 years
later. If readers will permit a personal allusion, I can well
recall the scenes of lingering wartime devastation and
suffering from my first visit to occupied West Germany in
the summer of 1951—the shell and bomb holes in the roof of
Frankfurt’s crumbling old Bahnhof, the huge piles of rubble
arrayed along the streets of Darmstadt, the ubiquitous
displaced persons.
When I returned to Europe during the period 1956-59 as
a member of the U.S. Army’s 8th Infantry Division, West
Germany was now a member of NATO and well along the
path toward the miraculous economic transformation that
would culminate in the 1980s. Most recently, during visits
through Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the
former East Germany, I observed a reunited Germany and
three new NATO members, all miraculously salvaged from
the ruins of a shattered Soviet empire. Yes, there can be
little doubt that in facing down and outlasting the Warsaw
Pact and its Soviet masters, NATO provided the security
umbrella for Europe’s historic postwar political and
economic resurrection, not to mention the far-forward line
of defense afforded the United States itself for the duration
of the Cold War.
But times change, and though it is certainly reasonable
to put a happy face on NATO’s activities between 1992 and
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today, there are those at the opposite pole who do not. They
view with apprehension such recent NATO initiatives as
the actual and promised accession of new members from
eastern Europe and extension of the traditional territorial
defense mission under the North Atlantic treaty so that it
now effectively embraces out-of-sector humanitarian/
pacification/restorative operations, possibly as far afield as
North Africa and the Persian Gulf. 6
Though the concerns of Americans opposed to such
enlargements of NATO’s roles and membership are many,
the main reservations are (1) that extension of NATO’s
protective umbrella to arguably marginal states could
needlessly bring us into renewed conflict with Russia; (2)
that proliferation of out-of-sector operations could
jeopardize American lives for goals not connected to our
vital interests; (3) that an increase of members will impair
Alliance resolve and unity of effort; and (4) that since U.S.
power is finite, any additional investment in European
military activities would dilute the resources and energy
needed to attend to other pressing obligations on the global
scene.7 Moreover, to the extent that such reservations begin
to jaundice popular sentiment in the United States, NATO’s
growing baggage could come to adversely affect America’s
commitment to the alliance and to Europe itself.
It is premature, however, to speculate overmuch at this
point on future public attitudes. A better approach is to go
ahead and settle tentatively upon which American stance
toward Europe and NATO is most likely to serve long-term
U.S. interests, and then trust future presidents and
legislators to lead the people along the gradually revealed
path of enlightened self-interest. And what might that path
be? Surveying the 11 authors who contributed previous
chapters in the present book, we find that all apparently
believe the United States should remain in NATO.
Disagreement first enters on the question of whether we
should continue to maintain a significant troop presence on
the Continent, with Dr. Carpenter and perhaps Professor
Mearsheimer being the only proponents of bringing the
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troops home. Even here, however, Professor Mearsheimer
appears to allow for some continued Air Force presence. 8
Not until we were confronted with a serious peer competitor
would he be willing to return major forces overseas for
commitment to an alliance.
The other nine authors can best be described as
“traditional old-school,” entertaining the belief that despite
the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of a
near-term Soviet threat, the better part of wisdom lies in
maintaining and strengthening the Alliance while
retaining a robust U.S. presence. Disagreement within this
group centers mainly on the issues of mission and
membership enlargement, with Professor Glaser skeptical
of undertaking out-of-sector missions and Professor Kaysen
equally skeptical of admitting new members. The
remaining seven, five of whom are retired or active military
officers, strongly support the path that NATO has already
set for itself, that is, undertaking all steps necessary “to
deliver to the population of the Euro-Atlantic area the
conditions which allow stability and security to be taken for
granted, so that they can be free to focus on economic
development, eradication of poverty, and increased
prosperity.” 9
In NATO’s view, such a prescription entails continued
evolution and adaptation of all aspects of the Alliance,
including structure, function, and membership. NATO
seeks to establish a process of “dialogue, cooperation, and
partnership” with the countries of eastern and central
Europe (including Russia and Ukraine) and also with other
members of the Organization on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE); to develop close working ties with other
European security structures such as the United Nations,
Western European Union, and OSCE itself; and to
modernize the military command and force structures, with
particular emphasis upon updating weapons and
equipment of the Alliance’s European members and
improving their interoperability with those of the United
States.10
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Under these broad rubrics, the Alliance has undertaken
such initiatives as the Partnership for Peace program,
adoption of a concept for combined joint task forces, support
of the European Security and Defense Identity, deployment
of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (formerly
Implementation Force) in Bosnia and the Kosovo Force, and
of course admission of three new members along with
pursuing a qualification program for prospective additional
members. The foregoing catalogue of initiatives is by no
means exhaustive, but it serves to convey the flavor of a
NATO that, despite its stringent force draw-down in the
wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, has since under
America’s prodding adopted an increasingly activist stance.
To this point at least, NATO seems to have pursued a course
fairly well aligned with that espoused by Mr. Holbrooke,
though perhaps somewhat less aggressive and decisive. 11
The Alliance has enjoyed a remarkable degree of
cohesion during the period of its ambitious post-Cold War
renewal, hanging together even during the centrifugal
stresses imposed by Operation ALLIED FORCE in the
spring of 1999. But such continued comity is by no means
assured. If Lithuania or Estonia, for example, successfully
satisfies the technical prerequisites for membership in
NATO, an outcome becoming more likely with each passing
year, the Alliance may find its declaratory policy on new
members at odds with prevailing geo-strategic realities. For
Russia is sure to object vociferously to such an “annexation”
of erstwhile Soviet territory, and there may well be talk of
war.12 In such a case, some Alliance members could get cold
feet, despite the relative toothlessness of the Soviet bear at
the time.
Professor Mearsheimer presents a trenchant argument
that the United States is unlikely to underwrite with its
blood and treasure those European wars in which Europe’s
own blood and treasure are equal to the task. Despite the
trenchancy of his argument, however, there remains a
strong consensus—though admittedly not a consensus
chiseled in stone for all ages—that the United States so far
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as its European commitment is concerned will continue
pretty much along the trajectory it has followed for the last
half century.
The reasons are as much psychological as strategic.
NATO, as several authors have noted, provides a hedge
against an uncertain future. President Bill Clinton was
born in 1946, only 3 years before the establishment of the
Alliance, so that his entire initiation into the external
world—the world of geo-politics and international
security—took place with NATO as an ineluctable given.
Like the UN, the Department of Defense, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and other such institutions, NATO is a
familiar and comfortable fixture in the collective
consciousness not only of President Clinton’s generation but
of later generations as well. The United States will likely
remain with NATO because it provides a sense of security
and, in its original incarnation at least, an abiding peace of
mind. Though often neglected in the calculus of grand
strategists, simple peace of mind is an essential factor in
any rational reckoning of security. But a pattern of
out-of-sector interventions seen as excessively
adventuresome by member constituencies would
undermine such peace of mind. Realistically, therefore,
there are built-in limits to how far the Alliance can or should
move toward a full realization of Mr. Holbrooke’s expansive
vision.
As a genuinely global power, with vital interests in the
Gulf and Northeast Asia as well as in its own hemisphere,
the United States can never afford to focus so
single-mindedly on Europe that its affairs elsewhere suffer.
The shores of America survey the Pacific as well as the
Atlantic, and if we must bestride the latter to attend our
eastern flank, we must bestride the former to attend our
western. Japan and Korea, along with the budding
industrial mini-prodigies lining the southeast Asia rim,
already hold a major shareholder’s position in the economic
intercourse of this country. China the colossus, with its vast
portents for good or ill, offers in the long term a more
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complex and momentous challenge than Russia itself. But it
also offers a momentous opportunity in the form of a
potential market of 1½ billion ravenously acquisitive
consumers. The success of the United States and the other
major powers in managing and accommodating to China’s
entry upon the global stage could well prove to be the
decisive political act in this world over the next century.
In the meanwhile, however, Europe remains the
sovereign locus of America’s vital interests overseas, and
NATO remains the principal structure through which we
exercise reciprocal security ties with that continent. We
shall in all likelihood find it in our continued interest to
remain the leading voice and presence in a vibrant, adaptive
Alliance. Our commitment there, however, must be
judiciously balanced by competing and no less compelling
calls for American leadership and involvement from other
points on the compass. Fortunately, Americans are a rich,
generous, and enlightened people, fully aware that creative
altruism in affairs of state ultimately redounds to their own
benefit and indeed to the benefit of all mankind.
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Secretary of the Army. Dr. Rostker assists the Secretary in
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fulfilling statutory responsibilities for recruiting,
organizing, supplying, equipping, training, and mobilizing
the Army as well as managing its $67 billion annual budget
and more than 1.3 million active duty, National Guard,
Army Reserve, and civilian personnel. Prior to becoming
Under Secretary, Dr. Rostker was Assistant Secretary of
the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. In November
1996, he was also named Special Assistant to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense for Gulf War illnesses. Dr. Rostker
received a B.S. degree from New York University, where he
was a Distinguished Military Graduate of the ROTC
Program and commissioned as a second lieutenant in the
Army Reserve. He also holds master’s and doctoral degrees
in economics from Syracuse University. In the present
symposium, Dr. Rostker introduced the opening speaker,
Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre, and served as
chairman of Panel I. In April 2000, Dr. Rostker was
elevated to the position of Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness.
GENERAL CROSBIE E. SAINT, U.S. Army, Retired, was
born at West Point, New York, on September 29, 1936. He
graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1958 and was
commissioned as a second lieutenant of armor. Since that
time, he has commanded units from platoon through Army
group. General Saint has served extensively with Army
units overseas, including two tours in Vietnam, and five
tours in U.S. Army, Europe. His assignments in the United
States also cover a broad range of command and staff
positions, including Joint Secretariat, Organization of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director, Executive Services and
White House Liaison Officer, Office of the Army Chief of
Staff; and Executive Officer to the Chief of Staff of the Army.
General Saint culminated his military career as
Commander of the United States Army Europe, Seventh
U.S. Army, and Central Army Group (NATO) from June
1988 until his retirement from active service in 1992. Upon
his retirement, General Saint established a private
consulting firm specializing in foreign relations, national
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security issues, and strategic planning. General Saint is a
graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the Army
War College. He was awarded a B.S. degree in engineering
from the U.S. Military Academy and holds an M. A. degree
in international relations from American University. In the
present symposium, General Saint served as co-host;
introduced the keynote speaker, General Wesley Clark; and
delivered the closing remarks.
MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT H. SCALES, JR., became
the 44th Commandant of the U.S. Army War College,
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, in August 1997.
Previously, he was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Base
Operations and Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command. General Scales
served in numerous command and staff positions
throughout the Army. His commands include four artillery
batteries, two in Germany and two in Vietnam; an artillery
battalion in Korea; and the U.S. Army Field Artillery
Training Center, Ft. Sill, Oklahoma. He also served as
Assistant Division Commander, 2d Infantry Division,
Eighth U.S. Army. He graduated from the U.S. Military
Academy and was commissioned in 1966 as a field artillery
officer. He holds master’s and Ph.D. degrees in history from
Duke University.
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